THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XI DECEMBER 1940 No. 12

THE SPIRIT OF CHRISTMAS

It was in the fourth century of the era called Christian that the date for celebrating the birthday of Jesus Christ was fixed. The actual date of birth is unknown, and in fact the very existence of Jesus Christ is in doubt. That in that era some Adept lived and taught the ancient doctrines of living by love and by sacrifice, of each individual's communing in secret and in silence with his Father in heaven and thus entering the Kingdom of Light through resurrection by the second birth, seems certain. Christmas is not the anniversary of the nativity of that Adept, but is fixed to represent it. Nowadays it is celebrated not only in Christendom, but in a variety of ways by non-Christian people also, *e.g.*, here in India. The celebration is more secular than religious, and even in the lives of the orthodox church goers the pre-Christian pagan customs are observed with great zest and gusto.

It would be a distinct advantage to the Cause of Religion, the aim of which ever and always has been to make mortals recognize and practise the Truth of Universal Brotherhood, if the story of the real origin and development of Christmas were to be known by the majority. The absurd claims made by organized churches about the unique and singular nature of Jesus Christ, his birth, his death, would be rejected and the parallel phenomena of the fall of Christianity and the rise of churchianity would be understood. For a real appreciation of the work of the Adept, whatever his real name and his exact era, it is essential to possess true knowledge. It is necessary to examine the doctrines attributed to Jesus, not only with the background of Judaism and of Greco-Roman culture, but also with that of the Egyptian, the Iranian and the Indian traditions, for these have all influenced Christian doctrines directly or indirectly.

The festivities of merry Christmas and happy New Year tend to unite the followers of different denominations of organized Christianity, and even the followers of other creeds. The orthodox rites keep the congregations divided in sects and no "heathen" would care to participate in any of them. Strange as it may seem, the Spirit of Christ—of love, brotherliness and unity—has a better chance of manifestation round the

table of merry-making, even with its objectionable features of turkey-eating and wine-bibbing, than in churches where partisan feeling is sustained in the name of religion.

The Spirit of Christmas—what are its real manifestations?

The joy born of the knowledge that the wheel of the Good Law moves in rhythm by the force of Justice which is Mercy, and that both pain and pleasure are avenues to that knowledge.

The mental habit of putting oneself in the place of another, which is real sympathy, and thus extending the hand of fellowship to strengthen the bond of human brotherhood, which is superior to national patriotism, racial pride and social claims.

The enlightened contentment which uses every event in life to improve prospects and to beautify them so that the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world may shine more brightly in our own hearts and may shed its radiance all around.

To be gracious, so that the weak, the ignorant, the downtrodden as well as the strong, the learned and the high-handed may acquire some of the qualities which belong to the Spirit of Christmas.

We must learn ever to remember that :—

> For even the purest delight may pall,
> And power must fail, and the pride must fall,
> And the love of the dearest friends grow small—
> But the glory of the Lord is all in all.

The Glory, *Vibhūti,* of the Lord is in each man, each woman, each child, and the Anointed Ones have exclaimed in every age :—

> I am the Ego which is seated in the hearts of all beings.
>
> अहमात्मा गुडाकेश सर्वभूताशयस्थितः ।

Recalling first that as fraternity does not exist on this earth, any more than do liberty and equality, whence the concept of these? Men could not have drawn the notion out of their experience nor have invented it by their reason. Not only could this idea never have begun to be realized but more, it could not have been thought of. It could not have dawned on human consciousness if there had not been in existence men in whom Brotherhood itself was already realized, already accomplished. Such men existed within the human species, had sprung from it, and yet were independent of it, exceptions to it and yet a part of it, each of them in himself a complete species reduced to a unique specimen. They were, they are, living models of the society to be worked for in the near future. On this earth divided and sundered, undermined by hostilities, harrassed by memories in which cruelty slumbers, anarchical, straining ever towards mutual destruction, they have been, they remain and they will be that love which embraces all men, although capable of devoting itself wholly to each, that enthusiastic, that overflowing love which makes one make a gift of oneself, that love in which all opposing factors are resolved and all contradictions disappear....Instead of venerating them, brooding over them, imitating them, following them, people reject them, would banish them from the community. People fancy that they can be replaced. But what can we expect of fraternities in which mere instinctive demands persist and which copy the very social order which needs to be reformed?

MAURICE DUVAL

PEACE FROM THE INDIVIDUAL

[Elizabeth Cross is now devoting all her time to writing, chiefly on educational and nature subjects. In this article she sets forth principles of importance to all those who wish to contribute their quota towards the establishment of Peace. —Ed.]

Practically every individual desires "consciously" to live at peace with his neighbours and even in the midst of wars there are isolated instances of utter charity and kindliness towards the so-called enemy. How is it, then, that peace movements as organisations have had so little practical effect?

The question has been examined from very many stand-points but the psychological and educational aspects have been sadly neglected. War is possible merely because it satisfies certain fundamental human needs. This theory will be challenged by those who can explain everything from the stand-point of economic determinism and who blame every war onto the machinations of international capitalists. Economics certainly has a great deal to answer for but the response to war involves more than money. Fear and lack of creative capacity in work, also lack of significance in daily life; these elements are too often overlooked.

The majority of children are educated on a fear basis. Not necessarily in a crude form. I am not alleging widespread child-beating or anything of that nature, but merely pointing out that education is threaded through with the competitive spirit of "do better than the next boy or girl" .... "get more 'marks'"...."win prizes"...."don't help each other with your sums" and so on and so on. Only in the very newest "crank" schools are these artificial stimuli discarded and interest in natural objects or thought processes substituted for old-fashioned discipline and competition.

The consequence of this early fear bias is that, unconsciously, we are all ready to believe the worst of each other and especially of the unknown. It is difficult, particularly in war time, to remember the hosts of completely ordinary peasants or carpenters in the opposing country, all hoping to continue with their own work.

Industrialisation has taken the creative spirit and satisfying results from our daily work. It is only the comparatively few agricultural workers, craftsmen and artists of different types who are working for anything more worth while than their weekly wage. The wage is, of course, vital, but does not compensate for the human loss of pride that is involved. Creation of some kind or other is essential for the satisfactory life and unless education can direct children into making such use of their leisure as to make up for the stultifying effect of their working hours the race will continue to deteriorate emotionally. This psychological lack added to the fact of emphasised fear makes for a population predisposed to welcome any change .... even involving unknown horrors .... as giving promise of a fuller experience.

When we note also the decay of any living religion or of any real feeling of significance in the community then we come to the conclusion that the average Western citizen, at any rate, is being

cheated of the fundamental rights of the human being. Primitive village life gave each individual significance; each man or woman was contributing his or her share to the common good and in so doing enjoyed, as a right, all credit or value that accrued to the village as a whole. In normal times the average industrialised citizen is completely oblivious of political events, is interested merely in his small family affairs and so leads a poor and narrow existence. The small rural villages certainly offer something better than that even to-day. The village often has its drama centre, the school is more involved in the real life of the community and each villager has an opportunity to enjoy collective credit. It is significant that only in the villages (particularly among farm-workers) is heard genuine approval of the system of dropping leaflets on enemy towns rather than bombs. The following remarks are typical: "Go on long enough with them leaflets and they'll be bound to see we aren't such bad chaps." "Yes .... never bomb the blokes at all .... why not go and do some stunts over there and bomb the wastelands .... just to show we can bomb but don't want to hurt 'em", and so on, whereas the city dwellers remark on the waste of time and the need for "putting the fear into 'em".

Thus we have fear, lack of creative work (thus leaving a vast unconscious yearning for change) and also an unsatisfied gregarious impulse owing to lack of social significance. War relieves all these urges. Fear is pushed into the background by action (many people expressed great relief at the outbreak of war between Germany and the Allies in September, feeling that the consequent activity was psychologically harmonious). Those many millions whose work was mechanical and divorced from fundamental impulses felt that they would now be able to contribute something to a creative effort and in so doing become just as significant as the effort itself. Even those who would scorn to express outwardly patriotic motives felt that, at last, they were part of a larger movement, that their individual lives were of real importance to their fellow-men.

This very brief résumé of what psychological tendencies help to make war possible may also help individuals to use their influence to make the whole system less hopeless. Conscientious objectors, however morally admirable, are tackling the matter solely from their own point of view and tend to be suspect as to their motives. Unless we, each individually, are certain that our private behaviour is completely pacific, we cannot be justified in asking to be excused from our moral responsibilities in war time. Unless we have made an effort to alter existing economic, educational and industrial systems then we have no right to shirk the consequences of their inherent evils.

We need first to cast out fear from our own lives, and that means learning to reconsider our attitude towards money, physical security, social approval and many other hidden dangers. There is nothing sensational in such a beginning, in such an effort to live at real peace with our immediate neighbours, to avoid suspicion and make a modest beginning such as was made by Jesus Christ and Buddha. Students of comparative religion will note that the great figures of the past, the founders of those religions that contained a fundamental message for mankind, made no attempt

to organise on a large scale or to influence (directly) political affairs. In fact Jesus rebuked all attempts to involve him in political controversy and made it plain that the spiritual could only reach material ends through spiritual means.

The individual can re-orientate his own life, through self-examination, and will find himself then influencing, unconsciously, all with whom he comes into contact. He can make definite efforts to improve education, industry, or social organisations, whichever form of service appeals most. There can be no true or satisfying effort towards peace if the individual aims only at saving his own soul and leaving his fellows to struggle on alone. There can be no satisfying *results*, however, if this *service* is interpreted as being *direct organising or influencing*. The mere touch of an organising system seems fatal to spiritual health (witness the decay of true Christianity at the touch of St. Paul).

Many psychologists doubt if any satisfactory civilisation can be evolved from the present system of Western industrialism. Certainly it cannot hope to succeed unless we acknowledge the defects and dangers of the system and plan education and leisure to compensate for the lack of human satisfaction involved. Every individual can, however, make the attempt suggested towards personal peace and social service.

ELIZABETH CROSS

CREATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

It is in the crevices and dark crannies of the human mind, rather than on its smooth unbroken surfaces, that the seeds of literary genius are most often rooted. Great writers (at least since the inception of the Romantic movement) are usually great neurasthenics....Would they have written better had they been less neurotic: or was the equilibrium that they established on the æsthetic plane closely connected with the lack of balance that distinguished their personal lives?

Thus Peter Quennell in *The New Statesman and Nation* some time ago.

The materialistic bent of such thinking is most baldly expressed in a question he puts, an affirmative answer to which would lay in ruins all the fair structures of the mind and turn the achievements and the hopes of man alike to dust and ashes. "May not consciousness itself", he asks, "be a kind of malady—a morbid by-product of inanimate matter?" Never! Physical forces and natural affinities of atoms may be sufficient as factors to transform a plant into an animal; but it requires more than a mere interplay between certain material aggregates and their environment, to call to life a *fully conscious man*. It is true that a vehicle of matter is indispensable for consciousness to express itself, but that consciousness derives from matter is as scientifically undemonstrable as it is philosophically absurd. Lack of balance in any department of man's nature is not a help but a hindrance to the expression of innate capacity. There are psychological possibilities in the "Night-side of Nature" which can be tapped by the writer or the artist who is the slave to opium, to alcohol, to lust, but wild and sombre fancies are not the highest expressions of genius, which depend upon the adequacy of brain and body to transmit the light of the real, inner man.

FUNDAMENTALS OF DEMOCRACY

[**P. Nagaraja Rao,** Fellow of the Philosophy Research Department of the University of Madras, examines the subject of Democracy from a broad Indian point of view.—ED.]

The theory of Democracy is not a definite system of political philosophy like Communism and Fascism. It is a collection of principles that are generally regarded and accepted as intrinsically valid. They are not "demonstrably" true in the laboratory sense of the term. They are accepted by the Democrat as self-evident. The accepted principles, *i.e.*, the axioms of Democracy are not verifiable nor can they be established by any rigour of syllogistic logic. For positing the first principles of Democracy the only authority is intuitive apprehension. It does not mean that everybody would assent to them or assert them. If any one were to question the validity of the Democratic principles, we have no method by which we can prove them to the satisfaction of the questioner.

What are the Democratic principles? First, that the individual is of the greatest value in life and that the success of any civilisation or the efficiency of any government should be measured in terms of the scope provided for individual development. The production of "the splendid individual and not the mechanically efficient society" is the aim of the Democrat. To a very large extent a Democrat is an individualist. The individual for the Democrat is not to be treated as "a drop of blood in a racial purity, nor as a cog in a proletarian or totalitarian machine, nor as an ant in a social termitary", but as a self that must live and grow according to the highest law of its being. Politics are secondary to it. The sacredness of the individual is of greater import to the Hindu Democrat than to the Rationalist. To the Rationalist there is nothing beyond the grave for the individual. The Hindu Democrat believes in the spiritual and indestructible nature of the individual. Hence his greater attachment to Democracy. Democracy to the Hindu is no secular creed as it is to the Rationalist West.

Belief in the sacredness of the individual, then, is the cardinal tenet of Democracy. To express this concretely, the poorest man or woman has a life to live as has the richest. The poorest has his own life, and is not to be managed and drilled by others for the achievement of their ends. So he must first give his consent to be governed at all and then be put under the government he likes. Nothing can ever compensate an individual or a people for slavery.

The really valuable things in human life are individual and not the things that happen on a battle-field or in the clash of politics or in the regimented march of masses of men towards an externally conceived goal. The organised life of the community is necessary, but it is necessary as a mechanism, as a framework, not as something to be valued on its own account.

The second important principle of Democracy is belief in the principle of freedom, as fostering the tender plant of individuality. Freedom is the life-breath of the individual. Liberty is like health and air; we know its value only when

we are denied it. Freedom is the thing for which the individual lives and without it he is no better than a robot, an automaton. The denial of freedom is the denial of all that makes life worth living. A systematic denial of freedom reduces men to the level of brutes. The denial of freedom produces in men listlessness and cruelty together or in alternation. Passive adaptation is impossible for the individual ; so the individuals that are denied freedom turn out to be grotesque and distorted specimens. In the long run their powers of endurance are also at an end. Endurance is the outcome of freedom. Without liberty an individual will not be able to learn to endure. Thus the denial of liberty would stand in the way of the achievement of true strength, which is valuable and real only where it is self-developed.

From these twin concepts of the sacredness of the individual and the necessity of freedom, all other minor tenets of Democracy follow. The Democrat has no faith in the cult of the superman. The Democrat would never consent to sacrifice the manifold personalities of the different individuals for the production of the more powerful or more imposing Leviathan. Democrats disbelieve in the principle that " the few must guide and the rest must follow ". The Democrat believes that all men reach their best in different ways. The ordinary man is neither wicked at heart, nor weak in head ; he is not even malleable clay to be properly shaped into form. The Democrat believes that the individual in a free environment has the greatest chance of rising to his full stature.

In the words of G. Lowes Dickinson :—

" What we should aspire to create is not men like statues, beautifully shaped for some one else to contemplate, but living creatures choosing good because they know evil."

So the Democrat is against all regimentation and tuning of the mind.

Is Democracy consistent with a State ? Does a Democrat feel the *need for a State* ? What is the function of the State in a democratic world-order ? Should it use violence and, if so, to what end and how far? The State according to the Democrat is for man and not man for the State. The State should make the individual good life possible. Its primary purpose is to maintain law and order, but its plenary purpose is to assist the individual to achieve the good life. The State should be concerned with background functions rather than foreground activities.

" It should not prescribe man's activities, but must be prepared to step in and check the evils that are likely to result from the economic, ethical and special activities of certain men."

The anti-social activities of some men have to be checked by the State. A certain minimum of force is necessary for checking such activities. That is the function and the justification of a State. Liberty along with Democracy would perish if men were too high-minded even to raise a hand in their defence. Force without justice is not more of a disaster than justice without force. If dictatorships are the example of the first, democracies should not exemplify the second. Democracy cannot do away with the State as such.

The Democrat is against power politics. He believes with Acton that that power corrupts and that absolute power corrupts absolutely ; power ex-

presses itself in a number of ways. A study of the entire civilisation in terms of the function of power is attempted by Bertrand Russell in a studied answer to Marx. The theory of Democracy believes that power must be submitted to checks and that it must be revised and be capable of being withdrawn. Power democracy must be tamed by educating the democracy. It is only democratic-tempered men who can successfully keep power in check. "Constitutions", observes Plato, "are not born out of rocks but out of the dispositions of men." A democracy without freedom and democratic-tempered men is impossible. The Democrat insists on discussion as fundamental to his creed. Its purpose is to reconcile differences. Toleration should be a moral principle inseparable from Democracy.

The democratic temper is achieved by a scientific type of education. The use of persuasion and reason in preference to force; belief in the assured success of reason—these are fundamental. The reason of the Democrat makes him confine the use of violence to a minimum. He substitutes scientific impartiality for propaganda. The Democratic temper wants to foster freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of action. All the various schools of Democracy are agreed that freedom, *i.e.*, political liberty, is the cardinal principle of Democracy. The Democratic ideal, with its banner of political liberty, was considered after the last war as the greatest ideal of political science.

The Democratic theory was translated into not very adequate institutions. No institution, however elaborately framed, can express the true Democratic ideal. The institutions through which Democracy expressed itself in Athens were of the direct type. But there was a huge colony of slaves, a negation of the principles of Democracy. In our modern world the theory of Democracy has expressed itself in the various forms of Representative Democracy. The parliamentary institution and the scheme of universal suffrage have come to stay as more or less genuine if not perfect expressions of the Democratic theory. Democracy is a social philosophy that argues that the general well-being is best attained by giving the individual the largest possible initiative in action. The institutions are framed with this end in view.

The great use to which political liberty has been put in the past could not easily be overestimated. The secular state with Democracy as its creed, expressing itself in the free grant of the franchise, was admired for a time. Since the advent of Marxian Socialism, however, people have grown discontented with the concept of political liberty and its use. Liberty is considered a Liberal fetish and a mere academic good. The cry of the day is that in a capitalist world order, *i.e.*, in an unequal economic context, political liberty is mere twaddle, sound and fury signifying nothing. It is a poor consolation, says Shaw, to endow an individual with the franchise when he has an empty stomach. Political liberty devoid of economic equality is considered to be an opiate administered by capitalist economists. For the first time Professor Laski qualified the Democracy under which we live and called it capitalist Democracy, where we have full political liberty entrenched in an unequal society. A true Democracy as distinguished

from capitalist Democracy should create an equality of opportunity and must try its best to diminish indefinitely if not to abolish totally the economic inequalities which strongly militate against the effective use of political liberty. The great task of a democracy to-day is to re-define the class relationship and to disentangle political power from it. In a capitalist Democracy it was assumed that once freedom was granted everything would follow : give liberty to all, everything will retake its proper place and be at peace. The main function of justice in a capitalist Democracy is the protection of property.

Capitalist Democracy worked admirably so long as the environment was stable enough to maintain the self-confidence of its governing class. But inherent in it was a new struggle for power. By the use of political liberty Labour got concessions for a time. By the time the era of capitalist expansion came to a close, owing to several economic factors, such as the contraction of markets, etc., the capitalist class could not yield any more concessions to Labour. The moment Labour pressed in to gain more and more economic concessions with the help of the political liberty they enjoyed, the capitalists had to cry halt. Any more co-operation with Labour would mean the extinction of capitalist profit. So they took to suppression of political liberty. This has been called the Fascist phase of capitalism, *i.e.*, armed capitalism.

The Marxians hold that genuine liberty is not merely political. It must imply economic equality also. Liberty and equality are not antithetic terms. "Liberty only begins to operate significantly upon the plane of equality, and without it", as Hobhouse put it, "it is a name of noble sound and squalid results." "Equality supplies the basis out of which liberty comes to have a positive meaning." The Socialists, therefore, hold that what we want is the necessary economic equality as the background for liberty. They decry political liberty as not worth having without economic equality.

Democracy might find its fulfilment in Socialism, but the doctrine of liberty advocated even by a capitalist is not as useless as the Marxians imagine it. It is by the effective use of political liberty that men have been able to achieve many a social reform, such as old-age pensions, unemployment- and health-insurance benefits, free education etc. The history of legislation even in capitalist Democracies shows that political liberty is not an impediment to economic liberty. On the other hand it constitutes itself the latter's ally. Democratic liberalism, far from being a foe of socialism, is its ally. What is Socialism, but the extension of the Democratic principle into the economic sphere? Students of politics with definite leanings to the left have expressed their despair of the possibility of ushering in Socialism through constitutional means.

Professor Laski in his recent book on parliamentary government has pointed out that the so-called Democratic institution, Parliament, successfully functioned in the nineteenth century because it rested on a community of interests among those who in practice controlled its operations. Throughout that century the government of the two parties —Conservatives and Liberals—could get on very well because both sides were fundamentally in agreement. Their quarrels were merely sham family quarrels. The end of the nineteenth

century saw the rise of a political party that did not agree with other parties in their adherence to the principles of private profit and property. So the issues that have been faced in Parliament since the rise of this party have no longer been mimic battles; they have been real wars. If the Socialists were returned to power at an election and if they tried to put their programme into practice there would be no sympathy from other parties because there is no agreement on fundamentals. The parties in opposition very well know that a Socialist order would endanger the capitalists. Under such circumstances the party of the capitalists will make use of all the key positions they control, such as the King, the Church, the judiciary, the police, the civil service, the press and the B.B.C. to resist legislation which would destroy the constitution. Hence the Socialist pleads that with the use of the legislative mechanism and political liberty alone we cannot achieve Socialism. They conclude that Democracy to be real must be Socialist. They distinguish their concept of Democracy as being socialistic and not capitalistic.

No true Democrat ever claims that Democracy is a final form of government. But it is the least objectionable form of government that is practicable. In the long run the Democratic principle makes for civilisation. It is not a mere form of government; it is an ideal philosophy of values. It is the secret of social peace. If human beings form one vast family, it is through the principle of Democracy that we may teach them, educate them to love one another and to pursue, in their common interests, the highest good of which mankind is capable. Call it enlightened self-interest if you like—but remember, it is enlightened—and therefore intensely human and not unworthy of men.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

THE GOLDEN DEER

Among the incidents from the *Ramayana* which the distinguished Kannada writer Shri Masti Venkatesa Iyengar recounted in the striking lecture on "The Poetry of Valmiki", which he gave at Bombay on October 3rd under the auspices of the P. E. N. All-India Centre, was that which led up to the abduction of Sita and the war which followed. It was the deceptive beauty of the golden deer, an illusive shape assumed by Mārīcha, that made the exiled Rama follow to catch it for Sita, whose fancy it had caught, and that although they feared that it might indeed be an illusion. Anxious because of Rama's failure to return, Sita goaded her brother-in-law, left behind to guard her, into going to look for Rama, and so was left without protection when she most needed it.

The glamour of materialistic Western civilization, the speaker said, was for India like the illusion of the golden deer.

> Western civilization is good, is great, but not for India's way of life. India cannot grow in a tradition which belongs to another country. Let us use the best which belongs to Western civilization but let us not follow the golden deer! It is an illusion. We follow it in spite of our good sense telling us that it is an illusion. We fancy that at least we can put an arrow through it and stuff its beautiful golden skin, but when the golden deer was killed there was found no beautiful golden skin but the corpse of a monster, Mārīcha's own real form. We have to follow our own tradition and to build up our own future on the basis that our forefathers have made ready for us....May we in India have the sense to pursue our work in the way they have taught us!

LIGHT IN ISLAMIC MYSTICISM

IV.—THE CONCEPTION IN LATER ṢŪFĪ TEACHING

[This is the last of this instructive series of articles by **Dr. Margaret Smith** on the meaning of Illumination in Ṣūfism.—ED.]

The teaching on Light set forth by Ibn al-'Arabī and Ibn al-Fāriḍ was developed on somewhat different lines by the mystic 'Azīz b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī, of whose life practically nothing is known. He lived probably in the fourteenth or the latter half of the thirteenth century A.D. and wrote a Ṣūfī treatise, the *Maqṣad-i-Aqṣā* (The Quest of the Highest), written in Turkish and later translated into Persian.

He teaches that God, the One, the First and the Last, the Incomparable, the Unchangeable, the Omnipresent, is an Infinite, Illimitable Light, pervading, comprising and comprehending every single atom of existent things. God is therefore always close to man, but to man He seems far away because he does not realise His proximity and can realise it only by the Light of God Himself.

Nasafī thinks of Being as having four aspects (*daryāha*). The first is that of the Absolute Godhead, Pure Light, Who was a "hidden treasure" and desired to be known, and therefore manifested Himself in external Being, first as the Primal Intelligence (the Universal Mind of Plotinus), which is also Pure Light, by which were manifested the Invisible World, that Ideal Spiritual World, which can be apprehended only by the spirit, and the visible, sensible, phenomenal world, which is apprehended by the senses. All things therefore have emanated from the First Source, the Divine Essence, and are manifestations of the Light of lights, and there is not, nor can there be, any other existence but His. The universe is simply the "mirror of God", in which His glory and perfection are reflected.

In dealing with the human Soul, Nasafī points out that man, like other animals, possesses a body and also the "vegetative spirit", *i.e.*, the power to grow, the "living spirit", which distinguishes the animate from the inanimate, and the "instinctive spirit" which enables what is animate to sustain and transmit its life. But man is distinguished from the lower animals by the possession of a higher spirit, the "spirit of Humanity" (*rūḥ insāniyya*) which is a ray of the Divine Light; but he does not necessarily attain to this or realise his possession of it until late in life. Just as the Divine Essence pervades and comprehends the universe, so the soul also pervades and comprehends the body, which is gross and dark, while the spirit is subtle and luminous. All existent things, Nasafī holds, are compounded of light and darkness, but man is only too often unmindful of the Divine Light which in truth illumines all things if he has eyes to see it. "Rise, look around", says Nasafī, "for all things that exist give forth a radiance which illuminates all the earth." But man chooses to walk in darkness, blinded by his lusts, while continuing to lament his want of light.

The Light belongs to the invisible

world of the spirit and the darkness to the phenomenal world of the senses. It is the business of man to try to separate the light from the darkness and to understand its nature, so that the light, which is the spirit of humanity, may prevail and be manifest. This is the Path by which man may ascend and become once more a creature of light. Nasafī compares the body to a lantern, the vegetative spirit to the lamp, the animal spirit to the wick, the instinctive spirit to the oil, and the spirit of humanity to the fire which kindles all. The instinctive spirit should be used to feed and supply the spirit of humanity, and man can strengthen and purify the light within by Renunciation, whereby the soul is cleansed from the darkness of sin and ignorance and enabled to attain to the light of holiness and wisdom. Knowledge of the self, Nasafī believes, like Ibn al-'Arabī before him, is the shortest road to the knowledge of God : the seeker must look within himself. Though it is really an illusion to imagine that there is any existence other than God, yet it is necessary to maintain this illusion in order to follow the Path, for it is the only means by which to attain to the goal.

The beginning of the ascent is the turning of the face towards the One True Light, but Nasafī observes that of the many who start upon the Path there are few indeed who pursue it to the end. The marks of the sincere seeker are a knowledge of God and His relation to the universe ; trust in Him, since He sustains all therein ; patient endurance and perseverance ; freedom from avarice, which produces satisfaction with the Divine Will ; humility and submissive resignation ; inoffensiveness and the capacity to live in peace and fellowship with others, refraining from controversy with them and lack of charity towards them. The true Ṣūfī should regard those of other faiths, Muslims, Pagans, Jews and Christians alike, as fellow-seekers after God. The Ṣūfī's knowledge of God and of himself will lead in the end to certainty and assurance. The traveller on the upward Path must be prepared to renounce all that hinders his progress and all that veils him from the Light, whether it be concerned with this world or the world to come. Wealth and position are hindrances, but much prayer and fasting may be hindrances too : the first are veils of darkness, the latter veils of light. Religious duties, no less than worldly goods, may become idols, and the worship of any but the One will hinder attainment of the Light. True renunciation means abandonment of all that keeps the seeker apart from God : but the complete renunciation of the self with all its desires will mean the acknowledgement of God and His overwhelming claims. When the seeker, aided by the light of the Divine grace, realises that God is the Ultimate Cause of all existent things, then He becomes the Hope in Whom he can put his trust and the Beloved, the Object of all his desire.

The traveller is now walking in the Light and now "the Day of Resurrection dawns for him, the earthly clouds roll away, the heavens are opened and God in all His Glory appears to his dazzled view." Having attained to a realisation of the spirit of Humanity within him, the seeker has arrived at the Divine Light itself, which was the goal of his journey ; he realises that it is found within himself, and so he knows that he is in reality one with God. The stages through which he has passed, says Nasafī, are the realisation of his crea-

tureliness, the passionate love which leads to the renunciation of all that keeps him from the Beloved, the mystic gnosis which leads him to ecstasy and the vision of Reality (*ḥaqīqa*), and finally Union with the Light and reabsorption in it.

Nasafī illustrates his teaching by telling a parable of how the fishes who lived in a certain river said to one another that they had heard that their life and being were derived from water, but they had never seen water and knew not what it was. So they decided to ask a very wise fish who lived in the sea if he could solve the mystery for them. When they had told him of their difficulty, he answered them by reciting these lines :—

O ye who seek to solve the knot,
Ye live in God and know Him not,
Ye sit upon the river's brink,
Yet crave in vain a drop to drink.
Ye dwell beside a countless store,
Yet perish, hungry, at the door."[1]

Then they understood what was the answer to their question and so departed satisfied.

In the fifteenth century the conception of Light and Illumination finds vivid expression in the writings of the mystic poet Nūr al-Dīn (The Light of Religion) 'Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī (1414-1492 A.D.), who was born at Jām in Khurasān. Of himself he said : "Born in Jām and dipt in the *Jām* of Holy Love, for this double reason, I must be called Jāmī in the Book of Song." He was later known as "Chief of the Poets" and "Elephant of Wisdom". After much study, he travelled to Baghdad, Aleppo, Damascus, and Tabrīz, and then retired into a life of seclusion, following the Ṣūfī way of life. He was a prolific writer and most of his writings are mystical, including the *Lawā'iḥ* (Flashes of Light), which is a treatise on Ṣūfī theosophy.

Jāmī regards the essential attributes of God as Knowledge, Light, Being and Presence, and He is Light because Light means the power of manifestation and being manifested. He conceals Himself by manifesting His Light and manifests Himself by Veiling His Face, *i.e.*, He is hidden as regards his Pure and Absolute Being and manifest as regards the phenomenal world. Like Ibn al-'Arabī, Jāmī maintains that the universe is the outward and visible manifestation of God; and God is the inward unseen reality of the universe. He is a Pure Unity and as Absolute Being He is manifested only to Himself without relation to anything else, but considered in relation to the universe He is also immanent in all mundane substances and is for ever manifesting Himself in them. These substances are first represented as Archetypal Ideals in the Divine Knowledge,[2] and then appear in the sphere of manifestation, which is a mirror reflecting the inner Divine Reality.[3] But though the Divine Light is thus shed abroad, like the light of the sun it suffers no modification of its purity thereby ; there is but the One, the Whole, manifested in its parts.

'Tis the bright radiance of Eternity,
That lights Not-Being, as we men may see.
Deem not the world is severed from the "Truth".
In the world He's the world, in Him 'tis He.[4]

Man, as regards his body, is in the lowest state of degradation, but as re-

[1] *Maqṣad-i-Aqsā* (translated by E. H. Palmer).
[2] *Cf.* Nasafī above.
[3] *Lawā'iḥ*, XV, XVII, XVIII.
[4] *Lawā'iḥ*, XXIV (translated by W. H. Whinfield).

gards his spirit he can attain to the loftiest heights. Jāmī gives a prayer which indicates the Path to be followed by those who desire to return once again to the One and All. He prays for deliverance from preoccupation with the vanities of this world and from the darkness of ignorance, that it may be possible to recognise things as they really are, so that this material world may be seen to be the mirror which reflects the manifestations of the Divine Light and Beauty and that thus the unreal may lead to knowledge and true vision and not be the cause of ignorance and blindness. Since deliverance from self is the way to God, he asks for purity, for other-worldliness, for alienation from all save love for the One. "'Tis love alone", Jāmī writes, "which from thyself will save thee", and the mystic must banish from his life all that is incompatible with love and attraction towards the Highest; though he should employ all eternity in seeking communion with the Divine, it would be as nothing in comparison with the end attained. All thought save of the One must be expelled, so that the All-Glorious may "cast His beams" into the heart and save the seeker from himself. So there will remain with him no consciousness of himself and no realisation even that he has passed away from self, for there will remain only God alone. "Then, if thou regardest thyself, it is He Whom thou dost regard: if thou speakest of thyself, it is He of Whom thou speakest." So the relative has become the Absolute and "I am the Creative Truth" is the same as "He is the Creative Truth",[1] Who has manifested Himself unveiled to His lover, whose soul is merged in that resplendent Light, whose eyes are

> Seal'd in the Light of Thee to all but Thee,
> Yea, in the Revelation of Thyself
> Self-lost and conscience-quit of Good and Evil.[2]

This state of Unification, in Jāmī's teaching, can be a continuous experience for those who have attained to it, who strive at all times and in all circumstances to maintain their consciousness of it, whether they come or go, whether they eat or sleep, whether they speak or listen. Of that state he writes: "When God all-Glorious manifests His Essence to anyone, that one will find his own essence and attributes and actions to be all utterly absorbed in the Light of the Divine Essence and in the attributes and actions and the will of God: and he sees his attributes to be the attributes of God and his actions to be God's actions, because he is completely absorbed in Union with the Divine: and beyond this stage, there is no further stage of union for man. For when the eye of the soul—the inner spiritual vision—is rapt away to the contemplation of the Divine Beauty, the light of the understanding, by means of which we distinguish between different things, is extinguished in the dazzling Radiance of the Eternal Essence and the distinction between the temporal and the eternal, the perishable and the imperishable, vanishes, and this state is called Union."[3]

MARGARET SMITH

[1] *Lawā'iḥ*, VI, referring to the words of Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj. *Cf.*, THE ARYAN PATH, April, 1931.
[2] *Salāmān u Absāl*, Prologue (translated by E. Fitzgerald).
[3] *Nafaḥāt al-Uns*, p. 527.

TUKARAM'S CONCEPTION OF GOD

[Chintamani Apte is making Indian Mysticism his chief subject of research at Santiniketan.—ED.]

There has always been a remarkable absence of sensuousness in the spiritual strivings of the people of Maharashtra. When the wave of the religion of the heart reached them from other parts of India they selected for their devotional worship the God Vitthala of Pandharpur, a manifestation of Shri Krishna. Their ethical outlook coloured this new emotional religion. In the first half of the seventeenth century, when Tukaram lived, this movement had spread far and wide, even to the remote villages of Maharashtra. Tukaram's own ancestors were devotees of Vitthala. The mental make-up of the race and the tradition of devotional worship even in his own family suggest reasons for Tukaram's idol-worship and help to explain his spiritual development. Tukaram's worship is perhaps the most emotional of all the saint-poets of Maharashtra ; and yet the element of sensuousness is altogether absent from it. So also are missing the sky-touching flights of emotion and imagination. His emotions are pure in character and restrained in expression.

Tukaram's God is personal, and his relation with Him is one of love, resembling most the relation between a child and its mother ; its development is uneven. His spiritual career is chequered throughout with longing, disappointment and joyful realization. Gradually the character of his God undergoes a change. He, who had been at first an individual, becomes, in the end, the universal immanent God. Then Tukaram, at the height of his spiritual development, realises that his self has become one with the omnipresent God ; and so, one with the universe. The aim of this article is to show the development of Tukaram's God from the individual to the universal Immanence, through the different moods of his spiritual career.

Tukaram's parents have died ; famine has played havoc in his family ; his cattle have perished ; his trade has dwindled ; his estate has come down to ruin ; his good name and credit in the village are gone ; his son and his wife have died of starvation. To fill the cup of his sorrow, his second wife quarrels with him always, and ill-treats his guests. These hardships and troubles make the worldly life impossible for Tukaram. His torment and suffering become unbearable. He seeks solace at the feet of God. He begins his religious life in the traditional mode. He takes to singing *kirtans* and *bhajans* and fasting on the eleventh day of each half of the lunar month. He spends his days on the top of a hill near his native Dehu and his nights in the temple of Vithoba in that village. He takes to the service of saints and of the people and also to the reading of the old Marathi religious poets, Dnyaneshwar, Namdev and Eknath.

All this discipline so prepares his mind that on a particular auspicious day, Thursday, the 10th day of the bright half of Magh in 1619, he dreams that he receives from Babaji Chaitanya, whom he calls his Guru, the sacred mantra "Rama, Krishna, Hari" for meditation.

Thus his own dream or rather his own mind lays the foundation for the unfolding of his true self.

But the ill-educated Tukaram finds it impossible to meditate on an impersonal God. He says :—

"It will not be possible for me—a mortal being—O God, to see Thy infinite form, which is above the heavens and below the nether worlds."

He implores God to take some form for him.

Fortunately for Tukaram, he has inherited an image of God which had been worshipped in his family for several generations. It is an idol of the God Vitthal of Pandharpur, a manifestation of the God Krishna. The form of this God Tukaram describes in one of his *abhangas* (poems) :—

"He stands on the brick, hands rested on the waist. Round His neck is the garland of *Tulsi* beads, and yellow is the lower garment. In His ears are shining the ear-rings of a fish-form and the *Kaustubha-jewel* is shedding its lustre down His neck."

Tukaram makes the realisation of this form the sole aim of his life :—

"O God ! I shall do no other Sadhana for meeting Thee. I have made Thy face and feet the cynosure of my eyes."

He doubts that his God may be convinced of his sincerity by his simply saying that he has made this his only occupation ; and so he continues to repeat that it is his only and most ardent desire in life :—

"I lose my patience without Thee. Nothing I want, O God ; for none but Thee gives me comfort. Show me Thy four-handed vision ; I am pining to see Thy feet."

In his innocent hope that his God may be moved easily, he tells his dream of what he will do when he meets his God :—

"On seeing Thee, I shall embrace Thy feet, and fix my vision on Them ; I shall stand before Thee with folded hands. And when Thou wilt ask, I shall tell Thee good things in solitude, my Lord."

But Tukaram finds that his God does not come to speak with him. Yet another hope lingers in his mind, that perhaps his God is preoccupied somewhere else and so has not come. He asks Him :—

"Art Thou too engaged elsewhere, to attend to a devotee's call ? Or, art Thou caught in the meshes of the Gopis' devotion and art looking at their faces ? Or art Thou fallen asleep ? Or is the way that Thou hast to cross very far off ?"

For a moment, a doubt occurs to his mind that perhaps because of his own faults and sins his God does not appear. And yet Tukaram begs Him to take compassion on him. He implores :—

"I have become mad after Thee, my Lord. I am vainly looking in various directions for Thee. I am panting without Thee as a fish without water."

His condition has become helpless, he is wearied of life, his suffering has become intense. He says :—

"I have become wearied, my Mother, and can walk no longer. Lift me up in Thy kindness and love. Put me to Thy breast, and ward off my hunger."

Not only has he got wearied ; his very life is fading away. He entreats God to show His face once at least, and to clasp him to His bosom. When he sees that still his God does not come to his help he requests Him to appear in a dream at least.

But all in vain ! He does not come. Tukaram feels disappointed ; he com-

plains of this to God, vainly hoping that, then, out of shame, He may show His face. He says :—

"Thou art reputed to be so near. Thou livest in my heart and yet dost not show Thyself to me. Thou art cruel and shameless."

He adds that he has remained for thirteen days without food and drink. But Tukaram finds that all this penance is of no use. His God still remains a stone image.

Now he sees all his hopes shattered. He finds his God as usual indifferent to his torment and suffering. In a state of desperation he begins to abuse Him. He bursts out :—

"Thou art shameless and without caste and race. Thou art a thief, and an adulterer. Thou livest upon stones, and mud....animals and trees. I know that Thou art an ass, and a dog, and an ox, and bearest all sorts of burdens. Thou art a liar."

Even this abuse does not satisfy Tukaram. He begins to question God's very existence and His Godhood. He tells Him in a fit of anger :—

"Thou hast forgotten that our devotion has endowed Thee with Godhood. Great men are short of memory. It is due to us that Thou art able to move. Thou hast lived in the great void. It is we who give Thee a form and a name. Who else cares for Thee?"

He returns God's arrogance in kind by saying, "It is due to us that Thou art made God at all."

At last his mind is purged of its base stuff. It has become pure. His desires and passions are controlled. He has freed himself from the clutches of this material world. His mind has begun to reveal its true nature to him. And so he finds that at last his denial of his God's existence is having its effect. No more is his God a mere stone image. He says :—

"The living body is dead, and has been placed in the cemetery. Passions are crying that their lord is gone, and death is crying that he has lost his control. The fire of illumination is burning the body with the fuel of dispassion. The pitcher of Egoism is whirled round the head, and is broken to pieces. The death-cry "I am God" emerges vociferously."

Further he says, "The light which was hidden within is now illuminating the whole world. The joy is pervading everything." And so, now he feels, "the image has come to life." His God has put aside the veil and has come to meet him. He finds his patient waiting has come to success. Their long parting from each other has come to an end. He exclaims in joy :—

"How blessed am I that I have seen Thy feet to-day, O God! To-day's gain is indescribable. Its auspiciousness is beyond measure."

Then comes their meeting which he describes in very loving terms :—

"Thy hand is on my head and my heart is on Thy feet. Thus have we been interlocked body into body, self into self."

He continues to speak to Him of what bliss, what happiness he feels now :—

"I see Thy face and the vision gives me infinite bliss. My mind is riveted on it, and my hands cling to Thy feet. As I look at Thee, all my mental agony vanishes. Bliss is now leading me to an ever higher bliss."

In his anxiety lest he lose Him soon, Tukaram asks God to wait a little, to stand before him and to look at him. But later he almost repents of what he

asked from Him in his ecstasy of joy. His God takes a playful and affectionate revenge. He punishes Tukaram for his childish mistake. Tukaram complains :—

"Where can I run? Thou followest me wherever I go, and makest it impossible for me to forget Thee. Thou hast deprived me of solitude, and there is no place without Thee. Thou hast robbed away my heart, which was all my treasure."

Tukaram is very much troubled by this pursuit by his God. He asks why God has penned him in like this from all sides. His God pays no attention to his complaint. On the other hand, He makes Tukaram lose even his individuality. Tukaram finds his Self merged in God; finds himself one with Him :—

"Deep has called into deep, and all things have vanished into unity. The waves and the ocean have become one. Nothing can come, and nothing can now pass away. The self is enveloping Himself all around."

And also, "God and Self are lying on the couch in me. Tukaram now sleeps in his own form and mystic bells lull him to sleep."

Still his God is individual. But then there comes a time when Tukaram finds his God pervading the whole universe.

"If I mean to worship Thee, such worship becomes impossible, as Thou art identical with all means of worship. Tell me, my Lord, how I may worship Thee. If I give Thee ablutions of water, Thou art that. Thou art the scent of scents, and the fragrance of flowers. If I am to place Thee on a couch, Thou art that. Thou art all the food that may be offered to Thee. If I am to sing a song, Thou art that song. If I sound cymbals, Thou art those. There is no place whereon I could now dance."

Not only the means of worship, but all other things in the universe, Tukaram finds, his God has pervaded. He says :—

"I see Thy feet everywhere. The whole universe is filled by Thee..... When I walk I turn round about Thee. When I sleep I fall prostrate before Thee.....All wells and rivers are now Thyself. All houses and palaces have now become the temples of God....All men now have become God."

He continues to elaborate the idea with exquisite similes :—

"When one looks into a mirror, it seems as if one were looking at a different object, and yet one is looking at oneself. When a brook runs into a river, it becomes merged with it."

Now he finds that in becoming one with his God, he has also become one with the whole universe. He says :—

"By our relation to God, the whole world has become ours, as all pearls are threaded on the same string. The happiness and misery of others is reflected in us as the happiness and misery of ourselves is reflected in Them."

When he thus sees that his God and he are universally immanent he announces to the world the futility of idol-worship. He says :—

"Who will care for these paltry stone-deities which, when they are hungry, beg alms for themselves? ... These little deities hide their faces under the red ointment which besmears their bodies. The real God is the universal immanent God."*

CHINTAMANI APTE

* The English renderings of the poems quoted in this article I have taken from *Mysticism in Maharashtra* by Prof. R. D. Ranade of the Allahabad University. I acknowledge my deep gratitude to him.

TRUTH WILL PREVAIL

[**Edward Farrell** has studied law, spends his spare time in libraries, has been employed by the U. S. A. Government and has owned a book-shop. In story form he discusses the relation between the waking and the dream states and compares their relative reality.—ED.]

A short while ago I read in my newspaper that Alfred Tiedeman of our diplomatic corps was dead, and I wondered why the news account referred to him as an eccentric. Apart from his being satisfied to live in an obscure part of the world, among primitive people, he had seemed normal enough to me when we were associated in the Department of State for the few months he was back here in 1930.

But when Alfred's son, Morpheus Tiedeman, called on me a week ago, I soon found out just how eccentric the father must really have been, for no sooner had I innocently suggested to the lad that perhaps we should postpone a long visit until the morrow as foolish dreams had kept me awake the night before and left my mind sluggish, than the skeleton was out of the closet.

"Foolish dreams!" he cried, shocked. "Foolish preparation for dreams, you must mean, for surely dreams are never foolish. Or are there still occasional stragglers from that truth and you, my father's friend, among them!"

"It is you who are the stray one, if you actually hold a brief for dreams", I said to him.

"What!" Morpheus exclaimed. And his next words brought out that his father (being his only teacher) had taught him to live primarily to dream; had brought him up to believe that the waking state is subsidiary to the dreaming one.

When I had convinced Morpheus that men generally dismiss dreams lightly, he asked me how they could do that. "To defend dreams is the last thing I thought I should ever have to do", he said.

I didn't mind discussing dreams with the fellow, as I had lately given them a little not-too-serious thought myself. So I said: "I suppose that in every way the dream is inferior to the waking state; why, there is not even continuity from one dream to another."

"I consider that my dreams have an ideal continuity", Morpheus retorted. "Dreams are no better than the waking preparation for them, naturally; and if you can't control the continuity of your dreams, it must be because you have not trained yourself to do so. The waking state is necessary to dreams, of course; it is the half-way house—just as childhood is necessary to adult life, without itself being a state one wishes to remain in forever. Also, the waking state is invaluable because it enables us to exercise control over what we are to dream—an ideal control so far as the dream is concerned, since in the dream there is no recollection of predetermination. And perhaps that is free-will in the nearest sense that man can have it: a dreamer not only enjoying the experience of free-will, but in the waking state before the dream having actually ordered the approximate nature of that experience."

Morpheus went on: "One can dream of a thing from various angles, too, and so judge it impartially. In waking moments, one can experience so many things only by eliminating other perhaps equally

desirable ones ; the waking state's too constant continuity then makes it impossible for one to try, except in imagination, the things eliminated. In dreams one need not be continually choosing what to do, what course to follow : in a dream one is master of time, space and matter and can try everything ; can even experience repeatedly that duality of being which is only occasionally even approached in the waking state."

As Morpheus talked, I found myself thinking : " Do not even I see and hear in my poor dreams those who live far away ? Do not I frequently and joyfully bring back from many years my own dead father ? Does not my enemy become my brother again ? " But I said : " A dream is of things not material and therefore of things unreal " ; and I cited the story, which I suddenly remembered having come across in reading Plutarch, of the courtesan Thonis. (A certain Egyptian, it seems, had become enamoured of Thonis ; but the price she had set on her favours was a higher one than he wished to pay. Afterwards, he dreamed that he had accomplished his desire and his passion for her cooled. Upon hearing this, Thonis sued him in court for the money she claimed was due to her ; and the judge, having heard the case argued, ordered the man to place in a glass vessel the exact sum demanded and to wave it backwards and forwards while Thonis clutched at its shadow, because the young man's dream had been but a shadow of reality.)

" I heard substantially the same story from Father ", Morpheus said, " as of the woman Lamia. There is nothing proved by it, though. The judge should have awarded the woman even more gold than she had asked (to pay her in your coin), or (as I would have it) suggested to her the far greater pleasure she might obtain by going home and dreaming she had received the gold. It is not sufficient to say of a dream that it is but a shadow of reality—although I suppose how much more than a shadow it is may vary in this case and that, just as waking life means infinitely more to one man than to another, and more at certain times than at others.

" But you must be waiting for me to tell you ", he continued, " how you can bring more continuity into your dreams."

" Not I ", I protested. " I might start dreaming I was in hell, and not enjoy the continuity. I'll at least become more satisfied first that you have this continuity under control, that you can cut short an unhappy dream."

" What ! you are afraid of this thing you have just compared to a shadow ? " Morpheus taunted me. " Or are you admitting, after all, that you do consider a dream to be quite real ? I don't so live myself that I have unhappy dreams except in the slight proportion that I find desirable to give balance to dream-life ; but it may be just as well to do as you suggest and let the ' how ' of continuity rest until you have more confidence in me."

And then I thought I had a real point against the dream. " When one is awake ", I said, " one can not only judge one's dreams and see that they are unreal, but one can also at any moment reason about the validity of the waking state one finds oneself in at that moment. In a dream, one never doubts the dream's reality ; one hasn't an aware-enough intelligence to do so ; one doesn't even know that the waking state exists as a separate thing."

" Oh man, have you none of the artist in you ? " Morpheus cried. " What you

have done is to cite another good point for the dream. You have shown that a dream is more real to a dreamer than the waking state is to a man awake; that the creator of dreams must have learned from the waking state never to let dreamers even once doubt the dream's reality. You are getting your arguments tangled, too: first you reject the dream because you doubt its realness; then you uphold the waking state because a man can doubt its reality!"

What was the matter with me? Surely Morpheus was not right, and I wrong! Frankly, I was nonplussed for a moment; but Morpheus kept right on.

"Perhaps you won't get so worked up", he said, "if you will let yourself realize that I do not so much claim that waking life is but a dream, as say that dreams are the equal of, or something better than, waking life—or, more exactly, that dreams can be made to be this."

When I then mentioned a dream's comparative briefness, how Morpheus howled me down! "The Truth is", he exulted, "that dreams—with complete continuity if you so want them—last centuries longer to the trained dreamer than the fullest waking life. Why, you can't consistently do other than dismiss waking life as worthless because it is such a mite in eternity, if you are going to dismiss even a brief, isolated dream as valueless because it is brief compared to the waking state. No, either both dreaming and being awake are degrees of the same good, because both are 'existing'; or neither is of worth, because both are finite."

"But there is no real time and space in a dream", I said.

"There is no real time, space, or matter in the waking state, either", Morpheus countered. "One has but to realize that an experience of an hour by a waking-state clock can be consummated in a dream in the space of a few seconds by that clock, to be forced to the conclusion that time is always an illusion (for if it existed at all in the sense in which you think it does, its existence would be constant). And if a sleeper in a room on a bed can dream himself on a far ocean in a boat (and be satisfied he is on that ocean), there is no good reason for supposing that he does not (awake) experience what he does without there being a world of 'real' space and matter. Time, space, and matter have no existence except in the idea of them, and as this idea of reality is more intensive in a dream, the dreaming state is for that reason alone more desirable than the waking one."

"You have no God in your dreams", I told Morpheus—"no hope of immortality." He replied that he was better off than that: that in his dreams he had no need of a God, no least doubt of his immortality.

"That's an animal existence", I cried.

"Don't forget", he retorted, "that I have all you have, plus the dream. Prove that the dream is less than I rate it, and I will still have the waking state you are so keen about."

"And speaking of God and immortality", said Morpheus, "don't forget that in the dream there is a much nearer adherence to the counsel, 'Do right because right is right' (not to say that the dream conception of 'right' coincides with the waking definition of it)—and man's adherence to that counsel is, I hazard, the real goal of most that is admirable in religious teaching."

Morpheus went on to tell me that his dreams sometimes seemed, strangely enough, to foretell certain happenings of

the waking state ; and to admit that the waking and dreaming states when fully understood might justly come to be considered as of equal worth, complementary to each other.

But I would not compromise ; instead, I quoted to him what Mencken once wrote about idealism : "In order to make anything out of it, one must first be an idealist. That is to say, in order to be instructed one must first be convinced."

"That is clever rather than damaging", Morpheus said, and to my confusion he reminded me of opposite uses of the same thought all the way from Christ's great words to the effect that those who are of the truth will hear it, to Shaw's aphorism that one cannot understand honour until one has achieved it.

"Let me prove to you", Morpheus then said, "that dreams are subject to control—even that your dreams are subject to my control. All that it will be necessary for you to do is to go to sleep for a few minutes. You should be able to do that in your chair quite easily, as you didn't rest well last night ; and I shall waken you as soon as you are completely asleep—and tell you the main facts of what you have dreamt."

Although I realized that Morpheus would probably waken me in such a way that he would naturally be able to tell approximately what manner of dream that method of awakening would have induced in me, I was curious enough to submit to the experiment. But for all his fine talk, while I slept Morpheus must have come to realize the essential weakness of his position, for he was gone from my apartment when I awoke and has not presumed to visit me again.

EDWARD FARRELL

ON FREEDOM

A curiously truncated definition of freedom given a few months ago in a broadcast address by Dr. Robert Ley, Chief of the German Labour Front, is quoted by Raymond Gram Swing who writes in *The Nation* (New York) on "Youth, War, and Freedom" :—

> A man is free first when he can eat, drink, dress and live as and where he pleases or finds necessary ; second, when he can wander out into the world whenever and however he pleases ; and, third, when others honour and esteem his labours. That is the true meaning of freedom.

Mr. Swing points out that not even such freedom as this exists in practice in a totalitarian state and that even as the formulation of an ideal the definition omits freedom of thought and of speech, freedom to formulate one's own experience of truth, freedom

> to contribute responsibly to the community, to help shape its life and direct its affairs. His freedom gives man an economic minimum and a sense of satisfaction in his labour, which surely is good. But it disregards his individual spiritual life, and the co-operation of men's individual spiritual lives for the benefit of the community and of the state. To put it bluntly, man is economically free but politically and spiritually enslaved.

The shadow of freedom without its substance can never satisfy the human soul. Not such, Mr. Swing shows, is the individual freedom that has been fought for down the centuries during which men have striven to be free and died to be free. They cared for that real freedom, he writes, "and unless we care for it we are going to lose it."

THE MESSAGE OF THE THEORY OF KARMA

[H. G. Narahari, M.A., is chiefly interested in the study of Hindu philosophy and pursues his research in the original Sanskrit texts.—ED.]

It is in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (IV. 4. 2) that we find the statement that at death, when the Soul leaves the body, it carries with it its knowledge (*Vidyā*), its deeds (*Karma*), and its reminiscent impressions (*Pūrva-prajñā*). Later in the same tract we read that it is these three factors that are chiefly instrumental when the Soul takes up another body. This does not mean that these three factors are the sole determinants of the fate of an individual, for the existence of a fourth is evidenced by at least two other texts in Indian literature. This is man's individual effort, called *Pauruṣa* or *Prayatna*. The *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (I. 350-51), which takes a moderate view, says that like the two wheels of a chariot, *Prārabdha-karma* and a man's personal effort (*Puruṣakāra*) should work in unison. And the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* (II. 5-9), which is less moderate, dwells at great length on the superiority of human effort (*Pauruṣa*) to *Prārabdha-karma*. Whether human effort (*Pauruṣa*) is stronger than *Prārabdha* or not, there can be no doubt that tradition accepts human volition (*Pauruṣa* or *Puruṣakāra*) as one of the causes of man's happiness or misery in this world.

After this brief notice of the traditional account of the theory of Karma, let us see if the various charges levelled against the theory can be answered.

It is well known that the doctrine of Karma, whose main purpose is to seek the origin of human happiness and suffering, is nothing more than the mere extension of the theory of Causation to the realm of Ethics. It points out that the individual himself is the author of his fortune or misfortune. People who follow such a theory cannot reasonably be expected to believe in "Fate" or such other outer and inexplicable agencies of happiness or misery. In fact, the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* (II. 6. 4a) says that "there is no Destiny apart from one's own deeds in his previous lives" (*Prāk svakarmetarākāram daivam nāma na vidyate*). It is, therefore, clear that the theory of Karma is not fatalistic in the ordinary sense.

An objection may, however, be raised that the check to human freedom is, so far as the theory of Karma is concerned, only intrinsic and not extrinsic, for, while it gives freedom to man when it makes him alone responsible for his actions, it also makes him helpless when he is asked imperatively to reap in a succeeding life the consequences of what he did in his previous life or lives. This objection can be answered in two ways: first, it is necessary to remember that a man's Karma is not the *sole* cause of his happiness or misery in this world, but only one among the various factors that bring such pleasure or pain to him. As already mentioned, a certain amount of personal responsibility is vested in man, by means of which he is at liberty either to make or to mar himself. If he should not use this power, called *Pauruṣa* or *Prayatna*, nobody else is to blame; and belief in the doctrine of Karma does not come into conflict with belief in this personal responsibility. It is, therefore, clear that Karma is not

the all-cause of human experience, and that acceptance of personal responsibility is not inconsistent with the spirit of the tenet.

Secondly, granting that Karma is the sole agency of man's experience in this world, we find that the doctrine still admits of human freedom, though in an indirect manner. When the law of Karma lays down the rule that one who has been virtuous in a previous life shall enjoy happiness in a succeeding birth, and that one who was vicious in a previous life shall suffer misery in his coming birth or births, we have in it an ethical law which is both just and rigorous. Accordingly, while the good man has no fear of losing what is lawfully due to him, the wicked man has absolutely no means of escape from what is inevitable for him.

A study of this law should make a man understand that the law of Karma is an ethical code, and that its chief purpose in administering justice mercilessly is only to point out to people that their real path of conduct is the path of virtue, straying from which brings serious consequences. The doctrine of Karma, therefore, indirectly points out that "ethical advance is the sole aim of all our activities", and so we are bound to take it that it implies freedom of action. It is a fantasy to think that the doctrine of Karma comes in the way of individual freedom.

We will now consider the objection that it preaches Pessimism. Very frequently the charge is brought against the doctrine of Karma that it rings a note of pessimism and that it is therefore a very bad incentive, nay even an obstruction to moral progress. "Pessimism", to take one definition of it, "implies the conviction that evil and suffering predominate over good and happiness." It may be that the Indian, making sure that supreme happiness is unattainable on earth, looks forward to attaining it in another world. It may be that he sincerely craves for the other world wherein he will be rid of all the miseries of this. It may be that his one desire on earth is to attain *mokṣa*, which is no more than complete deliverance from the cycle of births and deaths. But all these cannot be taken as evidence that the Indian hates the world in which he lives. It has, indeed, been universally accepted that the Ṛg-Vedic Aryans at least gloried in the life they lived on earth, and that they desired to prolong their life as much as possible rather than to get out of it. Even after death, the world they desired was not a world bereft of all mundane enjoyments, but a world which can well be described as "a glorified world of material joys".[1] There may be a number of passages in the *Upaniṣads* where the unpleasantness and the unsatisfactoriness of life on earth have been stressed. But even this attitude cannot be called pessimistic. As Professor Keith has remarked,

> "To find real pessimism in the *Upaniṣads* apart from mild expressions of the unsatisfactoriness of the finite compared with the infinite is impossible."[2]

The doctrine of Karma cannot, therefore, be considered to entail a pessimistic attitude of mind. As a thorough champion of human freedom, its chief tenet is that the cause of a man's suf-

[1] For a fuller account of heaven according to Vedic people, see the writer's article "On the Origin of the Doctrine of Saṁsāra". (*The Poona Orientalist*, Vol. IV, Part 4).

[2] A. B. Keith's *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, p. 581.

fering is to be sought not *elsewhere*, but only in the man himself. The individual alone is responsible for his present lot. But the doctrine of Karma does not stop at pointing out the cause of human suffering. It indirectly makes the individual understand that the right code of human conduct is the code of virtue. To follow that code is to enjoy happiness, and to stray away from it is only to suffer misery. The theory of Karma, therefore, has within it a solution to offer not merely as regards the cause of suffering but also as regards the method of obviating it.

This can never be the characteristic of a purely pessimistic doctrine. In fact, real pessimism is a mental aberration unknown in a normal mind. It can only be a product of a disturbed mind or a diseased body. A man may be pessimistic at times, but pessimism can only be a passing phase, never a permanent attitude of mind. The only logical course for a pessimist is suicide,[1] and belief in pessimism is inconsistent with the tenets of any religion. The urge of life is so imperious in all human beings that it is difficult to imagine any society which can lay down a pessimistic attitude towards life as its guiding principle. If the mere condemning of the sorrows in the present world means pessimism, few religions on earth can claim to be non-pessimistic. Statements are abundant in Christianity and other religions where a feeling of disgust is shown towards this world on the ground of its being steeped in evil and in misery.

In the famous encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of Pope Leo XIII, issued in May 1891, the Pope says[2] :—

"To suffer and to endure therefore, is the lot of humanity ; let men try as they may, no strength and no artifice will ever succeed in banishing from human life the ills and troubles which beset it. If any there are who pretend differently—who hold out to a hard pressed people, undisturbed repose and constant enjoyment—they cheat the people and impose upon them, and their lying promises will only make the evil worse than before. There is nothing more useful than to look at the world as it really is—and at the same time look elsewhere for a remedy to its troubles."

These are words replete with the idea of pessimism, and there seems to be no special reason why, of the various religious systems, Hinduism ought to be singled out and dubbed pessimistic. If, however, we desire to absolve all these religions from such a gross libel, we would do well to consider all those statements wherein the world is condemned, as *arthavāda*, whose chief purpose is to point out the necessity and importance of being abstemious as regards worldly enjoyments. In order to point out the supreme importance of the other world, the various religions often indulge in exaggerating the evils of this mundane existence but to understand in a literal sense what is intended figuratively is a breach of dialectical discipline ; the followers of the Nyāya school call such an argument an *Upacāra-chala*.[3]

It is thus clear that pessimism, as a religious tenet or a moral principle, is incompatible with the spirit of any religion and especially that such a champion of human freedom as the theory of Karma cannot involve a pessimistic attitude towards life.

If, now, we condemn pessimism as an

[1] *Cf.* Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar's *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals*, pp. 167-8.
[2] Quoted in Jawaharlal's *Autobiography*, p. 519.
[3] *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I. 2, 14.

unhealthy state of mind, it does not mean that the opposite tendency, *viz.*, optimism, is the right attitude. Not infrequently we find that a thorough-going belief in optimism leads to grotesque results. If pessimism would make a man absolutely hopeless, optimism very often makes him *too* hopeful. As Inge would say,

"An optimist is a barometer stuck at set fair whatever the weather may be. The man who says 'I am always an optimist' is a very irritating kind of fool. He is the kind of man who would buy from a Jew and sell to a Scot and expect to make a profit."[1]

The right attitude of mind, therefore, ought to be neither pessimistic nor optimistic, but a happy combination of both. While it is right for the individual to be conscious of the evils that exist in the world he lives in, it is necessary for him to be conscious also of the means of getting rid of these evils. This attitude of mind is described by modern psychologists as *Meliorism*, and it is this that is the true import of the theory of Karma. It is this alone that is the import of the *Upaniṣads* as expounded by *Sureśvara* and others.

Meliorism is defined as "the science of the improvement or amelioration of the human or social state",[2] and from what we know of the theory of Karma we know that its purpose also is not different. In making the individual suffer for his past deeds, and in thereby making him fret, it is implied in the doctrine of Karma that the sure method of deliverance from suffering is to follow the path of virtue. Neither Pessimism, nor Optimism, but only Meliorism, pure and simple, can, therefore, be the genuine import of the doctrine of Karma.

H. G. NARAHARI

THE PROGRESS OF THE PARIAH

The pretensions of wealth as well as of birth are exposed by Prof. Benoy Kumar Sarkar in *Man in India* (July-September) which reproduces a lecture that he gave a few months ago at Dhanbad. Every caste, he declares, is a mixed group. He brands as a fiction the existence of water-tight divisions of the population, maintaining that certain groups of the superior social orders include pariahs and the poverty-stricken among their ancestors.

And this enables me to conclude also that the unknown, the lower, the inferior, the depressed, and the pāṛiāh of to-day is tending to grow into the renowned, the higher, the superior, the Brāhman of to-morrow. In other words, the world is being considerably created and conquered all the time by the pāṛiāh....It is the poor that have conquered in the past and it is the poor that bid fair to conquer in the present.

For example, he declares, the men and women who have been making Bengali culture known in the world

are the ādhpeṭā khāwā (half-mealer), non-income-tax-paying, poverty-stricken people, the children of clerks, peasants and artisans, born and bred in mud-hovels and under leaking thatched roofs.

"A man's a man for a' that!"

But while recognizing that the racial and social "distances" between the lower and the higher are not as wide and deep as may be imagined by both, Professor Sarkar does not minimize the evils either of pāṛiāhdom or of poverty, insisting that they be "combated and annihilated by every possible means and in every region".

[1] W. R. Inge's *Points of View*, p. 48.
[2] L. F. Ward's *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, p. 290.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

JOAD INTERVIEWS HIS COUNTRYMEN*

Another book by that prolific writer, Mr. C. E. M. Joad. His views are familiar, or ought to be, to the present generation, for he believes in hammering his ideas into the brains of his readers. He is a utilitarian, believes in the good things of life and is desperately against war just because it militates against the good things in life and makes life harder for millions. It goes without saying that the book is bound to be saying hard things about war. But it is a tribute to England that such a book wherein he could speak of England and France as two retired burglars could see the light of day. An expression like this in Germany or Italy or Russia would have landed him in a concentration camp with the greatest despatch. But then this is just the reason why, in spite of his pacifism, he recognises that Hitler must be brought low, by force if possible, but he has no faith in this, and so he looks ahead and tries to see what steps can be taken to make wars impossible in the future. He has his own ideas, but he would like to learn from others. And so his quest begins.

He goes to different people, whom he describes with rather disconcerting frankness, but whose names of course cannot be divulged. So they just figure as A to F. A is a good patriot, to whom Mr. Joad willingly awards 90% marks for his sincerity, but gives a grudging 60% for his intellect, because A is against war and yet enters with zest into the spirit of war to bring Hitler to heel. B is a titled war-winner and C is a woman, a hater of Huns, whose English patriotism would not rest content with anything less than ostracising the Germans as a race outside the pale of civilisation; and yet who inconsistently admits that they are wonderfully good at music, can be very kind even to children and to animals and can keep Christmas better than it is kept anywhere else in the world. But these are "superficial" virtues and so her final verdict is for a Carthaginian peace; German cities are to be razed, the land is to be ploughed and then sown with salt, and one out of every five German women is to be killed off so that "they stopped breeding so many little Huns". Incidentally we learn that this last wish marks a certain moral progress, when compared with the outpourings of another "patriot", who "would annihilate every living thing, man, woman and child, beast, bird and insect"; in fact, "Germany should be laid more desolate than the Sahara Desert...if I could have my way." God forbid that he should have! And what are we to think of a learned bishop in England, a Christian bishop, who is quoted by the author as saying during the last war that "though God could not stop the European war he did the next best thing by providing a million British recruits"? Mr. Joad must carry his readers with him. If war could make us forget our humanity, it must be bad. But then how to prevent war?

Mr. Joad goes on to Mr. D, the reasonable pacifist, but his talk is found to be "a series of syllogisms rather than a call to high endeavour, a rationalization of selfishness, possibly even of cowardice".

Mr. E has a high religion broad-based on genuine pacifism; he wins Mr. Joad's admiration, but he despairs of the ordinary run of mankind catching his afflatus. Absolute pacifism is utopian. Is there not something more practical? There is Miss F, an Oxford

* *Journey Through the War Mind.* By C. E. M. Joad. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

undergraduate, in her early twenties yet, but already a fiery Communist, who can justify and rationalise anything that Lenin chose to do or Stalin chooses to do. A fine specimen of enthusiastic womanhood of to-day, but half-baked, one who could not be taken seriously.

And so Mr. Joad is stranded on the high rocks of thought. He has no doubt that Hitler must be beaten. He seems to admit, however grudgingly, that if force is ever justified it is against Hitler. But he knows that Hitler's defeat will not end the possibility of war. And all his endeavours are bent upon making war impossible. Is this attainable, short of a miraculous change in the hearts of men?

In his final analysis of the ills of our modern world he detects one villain: the nationalist State. It is variously branded as the "contemporary foe of human happiness", as "an obvious anachronism", as an "idol" with all the cruelties attached to the worship of idols in primitive religions. And why should it be impossible to put a limit to this ogre? And how can it be limited except with the founding of a League of Nations that has the power to make itself felt by its rebellious members? And as a first step to it we must have Federal Union. It is not a new idea. People do talk of it, and Mr. Joad has done well to emphasise it in his own graphic way. It is undoubtedly a book for more settled times, when men and women can think clearly and are free from passions that turn ordinary decent men and women into vessels of wrath that talk of a Carthaginian peace.

A. R. WADIA

TIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS*

As the title shows, the purport of this book is that nothing dies in real time. The author makes a distinction between real time and pseudo-time. Pseudo-time appears to be the time which is relative to my ego which functions through my brain in waking life. To this ego, the past has really passed; it is gone for ever. The future is not yet. The "now" is constantly moving. Both the past and the future are subjective and so unreal. The real time is the time 2 in which the ego itself is the object and is seen to function. It implies an observer who is not bound to the body and who can observe the ego that is so bound. To this self the contents of all time are equally present.

> What *has been* in time 1 must remain unchanged, though present, throughout the eternity of time 2. Nothing which has been passed by the time 1 "now-mark" dies in real time. A rose which has bloomed once blooms for ever.

This reminds us of the *Sākshī* in Vedanta, to whom the contents of all time are equally present. They are present through the very ignorance which the empirical ego professes of those contents. Vedanta would almost literally agree with Mr. Dunne's contention :—

> Even those who assert that we must remain forever ignorant of this or that fail to notice that ignorance which is *recognised as ignorance* cannot take the form of a terminating void. If you were completely ignorant of anything, you would not know that there was such a thing to be ignorant about.

But if the contents of all time are in this sense immortal, this is still more so with our self. Nothing can bring the self to an end in real time. This Mr. Dunne proves by showing that the real self is not rooted in the body.

> Now, you, I repeat, *observe* sense-data. You are not a conglomeration of sights and sounds and tastes and smells and pressures. ...Since the sense-data and their memory-images are "paralleled" by activities of the material brain, what is there, in that same brain, which parallels the you who observe, objectively, those sense-data?

In another place he says :—

> You are alive. It is presumed in logic

* *Nothing Dies.* By J. W. DUNNE. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

that you will remain alive unless there is evidence that something will happen to bring about a breach of continuity. Up to now the materialist, confining his argument to terms of a *pseudo-time*, has been able to produce psycho-neural parallelism as evidence for the validity of his prophecy. I have destroyed the value of that argument by showing that his alleged "time" is merely a *pseudo-time*. It is his turn to move, and to prove that we die in real time.

We agree with Mr. Dunne as to the immortality of the self. We also agree with him in the importance which he attaches to the self. According to him, the self cannot be described by any science. Or, as we should say, the self which describes cannot itself be included in any description. If we seek to study the physical world, we are led to certain ultimate problems which implicate the self. This self can never be grasped or known. Mr. Dunne speaks of "a metaphorical 'stick' the outer end of which was the objective world while the inner end was you". He goes on, "And I asserted that, if you attempted to trace this stick inward, you would discover that the inner end receded as a rainbow recedes." This recession would be in a series of steps known as a regress. He concludes that the ultimate knower can never be discovered.

There are, however, certain points on which we cannot agree with the author. He thinks that there is no way out of the regress. We believe that every regress is the product of a wrong way of looking at things. The regress can be avoided if we admit an ultimate Knowledge beyond which we cannot go. This Knowledge, in our opinion, is possible. The mere recognition of the regress does not solve anything. It is an indication of a view of things which cannot be ultimately valid. Also, we do not agree with the conception of real time indicated above. It is time in which the past, the present and the future are co-present, and in which nothing really happens. Such time is not time in any accepted sense of the term. We cannot create anything in it. There can be no meaning for ethical values or any other values that can only be realised in time. We may mean by real time eternity itself. But then we cannot retain in it the temporal content in the form in which we experience that content. If the temporal form is eliminated, the content is bound to undergo a radical modification. What we can experience in eternity will not be any sense-content. Mr. Dunne says that there is nothing

> which can destroy your view of the whole "time 1 past" of your sensory experience. Everything that you have ever known is immortal, but you see it in a new light and possessed of new values.

We add that these new values cannot be externally attached to the old form. The new values must change the form itself.

The book is written without any mathematics and without technicalities. But it is not free from obscurity to the average reader. It is very difficult to get a clear idea of the author's main thesis. One has to draw freely upon one's imagination in order to give sense and connectedness to the several points raised in different chapters. A non-technical summary of the author's previous works could easily have taken a more readable form.

G. R. MALKANI

TESTING CLAIRVOYANCE*

In THE ARYAN PATH for March 1936, I had occasion to review exhaustively J. B. Rhine's *Extra-Sensory Perception*. I indicated that, though in certain respects he seemed to be carrying coals to Newcastle as far as the Indian Psychology of Yoga embodied in standard Sanskrit classics was concerned, his attempt to offer scientific justification, under controlled laboratory conditions,

* *Extra-Sensory Perception: After Sixty Years.* By J. B. RHINE and Others. (Henry Holt and Company, New York. $2.75)

of Extra-Sensory Perception, *i.e.*, perception through other than the known physiologically recognised channels of communication with external reality, would be readily welcomed in India. This volume, which Dr. Rhine and his co-workers (Pratt, Smith, Stuart and Greenwood) have fittingly celebrated the Diamond Jubilee of scientific recognition of Extra-Sensory Perception by publishing, only reinforces my original conclusion. It contains not merely clarification of the many points connected with the method, technique and statistical results, but also a controversial examination of the criticisms urged against ESP and a refutation of rival hypotheses. The final part deals with the contemporary situation and with some unsolved problems.

Dr. Rhine has been quite fair to his critics. Chapters IV, V and VI, in which ESP tests and results are surveyed and thirty-five counter-hypotheses examined were sent to seven critics of ESP and such of the replies as were received have been published. Dr. Kennedy, it would seem, is the most uncompromising critic. In addition to these, I would draw attention to Chapter VII, in which published criticisms are controverted and Chapter XVIII in which the present situation is sketched.

Without repeating what I said in my previous notice, I would like to emphasize that a careful study of the literature available would convince the most confirmed opponent of the ESP school that in certain extraordinary cases perception of some gifted—I would not hesitate to term them abnormal or supernormal—individuals is so uncanny that it does not depend on the recognized physiological channels of reception of sensory stimuli and of motor response.

Dr. Rhine seems to have no first-hand knowledge of Yoga. He merely quotes some five sentences from the work of an Indian writer which is based mainly on English translations. I do not agree that Yoga is "prescientific". Of course, chronologically, the Yoga technique was perfected centuries before the modern scientific era. Factually and methodologically, however, there is nothing either prescientific or unscientific about Yoga. Dr. Rhine's work has failed to take note of two profoundly significant aspects of ESP which Yoga stresses. One is perception of objects without the aid of known sense-organs, in defiance of the laws of time and space. The second is more serious, and more profound. Certain objects like self, soul, or mind, the existence of which is postulated by Yoga, are in their nature and constitution inaccessible to sense-perception. These are easily, clearly and distinctly perceived by ESP. The "Vibhooti-Pada" of the *Yoga-Sutras* records some striking instances of ESP :—(1) Knowledge of the meaning of the sounds and signs produced by living creatures, especially the language of animals, (2) knowledge of previous lives, castes, communities etc., (3) perception of the thoughts of others, (4) perception of objects separated by time and space and (5) perception of the nature and the doings of the denizens of other planets.

At present ESP is restricted to *card-guessing*. From this to ESP as envisaged by Yoga is a far, far cry. I dismiss, as all rationalists must, the pinchbeck philosophers (Indian and European) and the counterfeit Yogis who make a living by duping gullible folk with promises of perpetual youth, rosy romance *et hoc genus omne*. Dr. Rhine notes that ESP is "unconscious", "erratic", and "unstable", but the psycho-somatically purified or perfected perception of Yoga is CONSCIOUS, SYSTEMATIC and STABLE. The need of the hour is that a practising Yogi should be studied under laboratory conditions. Graduates and undergraduates picked at random, who may by courtesy be labelled "subjects" would ever be in an atmosphere of suspicion, under the best of controlled conditions. In Rhine's work Indian psychologists acquainted with genuine Yoga will take sympathetic interest and, notwithstanding a million Kennedy's, it must be admitted that ESP in para-psychological research has *come to stay*.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Arabic Thought and Its Place in History. By DE LACY O'LEARY, D.D. Revised Edition. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., London. 12*s.*)

This is the second and revised edition of a work which first appeared in 1922.

There are conflicting views as to the nature, origin, extent and ultimate effect of Hellenistic influence on the cultural life of the early Muslims. Of the transmission of Hellenistic thought into the Muslim world through Syriac channels we have no doubt, but it is still a matter of opinion whether Latin Scholasticism introduced any remarkable changes into the religious life and thought of the Arabs. The neo-Platonists represented a very high standard of intellectual life and the cultural centres of the "classic age" at Athens imparted philosophical and scientific knowledge to the East. Even as early as in the fourth century, the Greek philosophy had crossed the Ægean waters and come into Syria, where a school was established at Nisibis in 310 A.D. by a band of Nestorian refugees who had fled from the persecutions of the intolerant home church. But neither the Nestorian schism which is acclaimed as the stronghold of Greek culture till 439 when the Emperor Zeno expelled its adherents, nor the seven neo-Platonist philosophers driven from their homes by Justinian to the Court of Nushirwan in 532, with their semi-philosophical, semi-missionary activities throughout Central Asia down to Arabia, succeeded in permeating the theological life of Islam. Much emphasis is laid on the Arab reception of Aristotelian philosophy and on the Mu'tazilites, whose doctrines are said to have been "remodelled and propagated under the influence of the philosophy of Aristotle"[1] but, strange as it may appear, all the chief exponents of this school, *viz.*, al-Fārābi, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and others, were devout Muslims, who did not dare assail the fundamental principles of the Faith. A breach between philosophy and dogma, to a certain extent, was undoubtedly effected by them, but it is quite preposterous to think with Dr. O'Leary that "the Aristotelian philosophy was received by the Muslim world as a revelation supplementing the *Quran.*"

We can well believe Steiner when he says[2] that "the Arabic Aristotelians were properly rather Natural Scientists than philosophers". Their most signal achievements were in the observation of natural phenomena, above all those of medicine and astronomy, but they never succeeded in disintegrating the traditional theology of Islam. The Muslim interest in Greek philosophy, which resulted in the translation of a large number of works into Arabic, was purely academic rather than philosophical, hence we feel constrained to agree with Dr. O'Leary when he says :—

> Thus the *Quran* and Aristotle were read together as supplementing one another in perfect good faith, but inevitably the conclusions, and still more perhaps the method of Greek philosophy began to act as a powerful solvent on their traditional beliefs.

Even the theory of the neo-Platonic origin of mysticism is as doubtful as the association of its fundamental doctrines exclusively with Vedanta or with Buddhism; and here Dr. O'Leary has been overzealous in establishing his hypothesis. To take an example, he describes *Tawhîd* or the doctrine of Unification as "the final union of the soul with God", in a way closely resembling the neo-Platonic teaching and wrongly adds that the exercise of the intuitive faculty of reason is not essential for its attainment. He goes a step further in the misrepresentation of the doctrine of *Halûl* or incarnation, which he calls "*Tawhîd* taking place in this present life"; undoubtedly he is quoting from the *Kitāb al-Tawasin*, when he remarks that here "the Deity or God enters the human soul in the same way that the soul at birth enters the body". This teaching according to his conviction is "a fusion of old pre-Islamic Persian beliefs as to incarnation and the philo-

[1] Dozy's *L'Islamisme*, in Chauvin's French translation, pp. 205-207.
[2] *Die Mu'taziliten oder Freidenker im Islam*, p. 5.

sophical theories of neo-Platonism". He adds :—

This is an extremely interesting illustration of the fusion of Oriental and Hellenistic elements in Sufism and shows that the theoretical doctrines of Sufism, whatever they may have borrowed from Persia and India, receive their interpretative hypotheses from neo-Platonism.

Similarly the doctrine of *Fana*, which is universally admitted on all hands to be of Indian origin, has been exclusively associated with the teachings of the neo-Platonists ; an assertion which the author has failed to establish. In the case of the doctrine of the "unitive state" he is quite uncertain whether it was borrowed from Buddhism, Gnosticism or neo-Platonism but, strange as it may appear, he says :—

But in this as in other parts of Sufi speculation it seems that the constructive theory employed in forming a theological system was neo-Platonic : even in mysticism the Greek mind exercised its influence in analysing and constructing hypotheses.

BIKRAMA JIT HASRAT

The Search for Truth. By SRI KRISHNA PREM. (Bookland, 1, Sankara Ghosh Lane, Calcutta. Rs. 3/-)

This is a collection of essays, as instructive in substance as delightful in form, on Hindu spiritual ideals, by a gifted mind and an earnest seeker after truth.

Man's highest object in life is to place himself in right relations with the Supreme Reality, by dedicating to its service his intellect, will and feeling. The means for the realization of this aim are lucidly explained in several essays, particularly in those which deal with "The Fourfold Path of Ethical Discipline", "The *Bhakti-Sadhana*" and "The Worship of God". Neither the study of sacred scriptures nor the guidance, whenever possible, of a properly qualified teacher, should be neglected. Books, however, are useful only in so far as they enable us to understand that truth is within us. The true Guru is the "Light which is reflected in the SATTVIC BUDDHI" and which gives us knowledge free from all doubt and hesitation. The little book is a manual of spiritual life by one who speaks out of the fulness of his experience.

In his striking essay on "The Birth of Sri Krishna", the author points out the symbolical or inner significance of the great passage in the *Gita* in which the Divine Charioteer says that he is born from age to age for the salvation of the good, the destruction of the wicked and the establishment of Dharma.

If, as ordinarily understood, the destruction of the wicked took place at the end of the Dwāpura Yuga, it is no consolation to those who seek salvation now.

Our true enemies are not without but within us ; they are desire, anger, greed, delusion, envy and pride, and they are overcome when the Divine Spirit manifests itself in ourselves.

If it were not ungracious to quarrel with one who is entitled to our gratitude, it might be observed that in his otherwise admirable essay on "Cruelty and Religion" our author is less than just to Śankara and Rāmānuja. If they are open to censure for quoting without protest, in their commentary on the *Brahma Sutras*, the Smriti injunction that the ears of a Śudra who hears the *Veda* should be filled with molten lead and lac, we should not forget that Śankara did not hesitate to declare that one who looked upon the phenomenal world in the light of non-duality was his Guru, whether he was a Chāṇḍāla or a Dwija, and that Rāmānuja accepted a Śudra for his teacher and encouraged the spiritual uplift of even Panchamas.

In the essay on "The Pollution of Temples" the author gives weighty reasons for allowing the so-called untouchables to offer worship in Hindu temples. It is a pleasure to quote from the essay the words of Pramathanatha Tarkabhushan :—

In whatsoever caste he may have been born, he who has abandoned low conduct and in whose clean heart BHAGAWAT BHAKTI has arisen, he is touchable, he is pure.

N. NARASIMHA MOORTY

Holy Images. Four Lectures given on Lord Gifford's Foundation in the University of Edinburgh, 1933. By EDWYN BEVAN. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

The subject of image-worship is one of the most important in the study of religion, and the present work on it by Edwyn Bevan is scholarly, instructive and extremely interesting. The author does not deal with Hindu image-worship at length as he does with the Western pagan and the Christian. His views on Hinduism are based on three works, Rudolf Otto's *Gottheit und Gottheiten der Arier*, Lajpat Rai's *The Arya Samaj*, and Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.* Had he consulted an orthodox Hindu who is well acquainted with the subject he could have had an adequate appreciation of what the Hindu thinks about holy images.

Swami Dayanand was shocked to find a mouse climbing up the image of Siva, either because he identified the image with Siva himself or because, though treating it as a symbol, he doubted its holiness in that Siva allowed an unclean creature to climb up it. Many illiterate and ignorant people in their unreflective moments identify the image with the god but the great majority treat the image only as a symbol. That Hindu religious art is preëminently symbolic is accepted by many interpreters. The four hands of the image of Vishnu, for example, do not signify that Vishnu has actually four hands, but that he has supernormal power. The disc or the wheel in one of his hands is not really a weapon but the wheel of time. Thus everything about the image is symbolic of something cosmic and philosophical.

Not only images but also stories about gods, it is said, have three meanings, the *ādhyātmic*, the *ādhidaivic*, and the *ādhibhautic*. The first is the absolute or the philosophical meaning, the second, the religious meaning or the meaning in terms of gods and demons, and the third, the gross or physical meaning. Thus there is the *Adhyātmarāmāyaṇa* or the philosophical *Rāmāyaṇa*, in which Rama and the other characters do not represent gods or human beings, but philosophical principles. Similarly the images too have a philosophical meaning. For instance in the *Bhagavadgita*, when Krishna shows his *visvarūpa* or world-form to Arjuna, he says that he is Kāla or time. Here Kāla may mean physical time, or the god Mahākāla who is worshipped in Ujjain, or reality in its temporal aspect, that is, the Absolute in its relation to the spatio-temporal world. The picture of this reality is drawn in many books as a big human being with many hands, out of whose mouth the whole creation, including humanity, is issuing and into which it is entering to be crushed between the teeth. Woodroff's *Garland of Letters* interpreting Kāli, the terrible figure which is the feminine aspect of Kāla, would be interesting reading in this connexion.

This aspect of the significance of the holy images is not discussed by Bevan. The question with which he mainly occupies himself is whether images are to be worshipped and whether they are to be thought of as representing God, but not how they are to represent God. But a discussion of the latter would have better elucidated the former question. The aim of image-worship is not merely to give a god to the ignorant but to create in them a sense or feeling of the ultimate reality; call it *numen* or the noumenon. When it is admitted that it cannot be thought of as having forms that we know of, how are we to think of it except symbolically? Then arises the question, what sort of symbols is to be used? The symbol must be capable of producing in our minds, when it is meditated upon, a feeling that is adequate to reality.

Not only can no image represent God, but also no picture can represent man or any other thing. The latter is only a generalised notion of the former. Hence both representations may be forbidden. Still they are symbols, clues to the original which can never be thought of in its purity.

Then there is the question whether the idea of the divine is to be produced by

anything mundane. The Hindu sees no objection to it. If the world is God's creation, it is not absolutely unholy and somehow must be capable of guiding our minds towards God. And how it is to guide us, that is, what the form of the object that is to guide us should be, is only a question of expediency. Bevan's own view is sound, that every help may be taken from the material object and from sense-stimulation to produce in ourselves the consciousness of the higher reality.

The book contains discussions on many connected topics to refer to which is not possible in this review, but which the reader may profitably read himself. The work is undoubtedly a valuable one.

P. T. RAJU

The Beginnings of Gnostic Christianity. By L. GORDON RYLANDS, B.A., B.SC., (C. A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London. 15*s.*)

By Gnostic Christianity the author of this erudite study means the Christianity of Paul and the Fourth Gospel. His book is mostly devoted to an intensive examination of the *gnosis* doctrine of Jewish-Gnostic communities in the first Christian century, a period of religious syncretism in the course of which there arose Jewish sects deeply infiltrated by Greek Philosophy and what the author calls, "oriental theosophy"—sects like the Naassenes, the Peratai, the Sethians and the Clementines. About the nature and teaching of these sects there is, however, little extant knowledge and such as there is derives largely from late sources, *e.g.*, Philo, Origen and Josephus. For this reason the arguments of Drews, Robertson and Smith to the effect that the name of Jesus was applied to the pre-Christian Messiah (Christos) are lacking in force.

But Mr. Rylands marshals his evidence astutely. He emphatically declares that "The Christology of the Gnostic sects was evolved in complete independence of the Gospel story and of the person of Jesus." The inference follows, though Mr. Rylands does not elaborate it, that Paulinism and Johannine mystical Christology have their source in the Gnostic sects. Jesus was a divine name before the Christian era. Doubtless it was; but that of itself makes a flimsy case against the actual existence of the Jesus of the Gospels. Nor does it appear to us that the author's exhaustive and illuminating study of the Odes of Solomon—a psalm-book of one of the heretical Jewish sects—adds materially to his primary case. The Odist breathes the atmosphere of the Wisdom literature, not of the New Testament; his Christos is not the Christian's Lord. That can be granted; but there is still no irrefutable case against critics like Guignebert who maintain that the Gospel Jesus was an actual personage who was fitted into the mythological framework of his time. As Guignebert says, "Christian propaganda created, developed and elaborated a Christ myth at the expense of Jesus. But it did not invent Jesus himself...." Yet it is true that we know very little about the historic Jesus: the grains of information we glean from the Gospels have become very dubious mountains. Jesus the prophet and teacher becomes Christ the Saviour-God. This transformation professing Christians will have sooner or later to recognise, and books like Mr. Rylands's will help them to do so.

Yet in one sense, the traditionalist Christian is perhaps nearer the truth than the old-school liberal. The New Testament as a whole, taken at its face value, is aglow with the conviction that Jesus is the Christ, the veritable Son of God. That, says the liberal, is mythology. Well and good, mythology it is; but the liberal's Perfect Man is sheer romanticism. That then is the dilemma forced upon thinking Christians to-day. They must boldly recognise the presence of myth in their Christianity; discover and interpret the essential and universal meaning of this myth; and at all costs preserve the Christian ethic of love to God and Man.

LESLIE BELTON

Poltergeists. By SACHEVERELL SITWELL. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 15*s.*)

Readers of this book are repeatedly warned that they should expect no explanation of the stories related. In fact Mr. Sitwell insists that no such explanation exists. The result is a volume of uncertain entertainment though it might so easily have been made of more than passing interest, a book of valuable instruction at a time when the "world" of which it treats is playing so vital a rôle in human affairs.

We may therefore be excused if we leave these stories to the casual reader and seek in the teachings of pagan philosophers, the Hermetists, the Gnostics, the Egyptians and the Greeks, keys to the *rationale* of poltergeist phenomena which, far from denying, they taught as a *science.*

Poltergeists have long been known in the East as a class of elementals or nature forces, good or bad, each class having a name which afforded the key to the nature of its activities. These forces, conscious but not self-conscious, and devoid of will, are the servile agents of those whose power is derived from a knowledge of the occult laws of nature, but they obtain complete mental and moral sway over the medium, certain vicious types enticing their victims to end by suicide a life of moral degradation. While some delight in the freshly spilt blood of war on which they thrive, others are satisfied with the tricks of which Mr. Sitwell writes. Known as gnomes, sylphs, fairies, djins etc., they are the Soul of the elements, the capricious forces in Nature acting under one immutable Law, inherent in these Centres of Force and subject to the trained WILL of man.

Hosts of these elementals are constantly magnetically attracted and repelled by our thoughts. Some remain to enter into certain aspects of our constitution and have to do with the building of character, birth and death, fate and free-will, moods and many diseases. More than a hint as to the extraordinary power of individuals who can accomplish the good *or evil* they would without apparently lifting a finger is not hard to discern.

Yet Mr. Sitwell leaves these interesting aspects of the question untouched and contents himself with tale telling.

Those interested in the philosophy arising from the subject of poltergeists should study Madame Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled* as well as certain of her articles devoted to this and kindred subjects. There they will find not only those *scientific* explanations denied by Mr. Sitwell, but phenomena of infinitely more extraordinary and thrilling character.

D. C. T.

The Man from Heaven. By A. C. GARRETT. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

This book claims to be "a simpler and more complete life of Christ than many that have recently appeared, a restatement of the subject embodying the results of the latest scholarship and yet designed for the general reader". It certainly is a popular, as distinct from a scholarly, narrative of the life of Jesus and the author tries to make it vivid by references to his own experiences in Palestine, first-hand acquaintance with the land of Jesus' activities being an invaluable asset to a narrator of his life.

But the effort made by the writer to weave a continuous narrative out of the often conflicting records in the Gospels seems to be uncritical. Thus he finds room for two cleansings of the Temple, one at the beginning of the ministry according to the Johannine Gospel and the other at its close according to the far more probable Synoptic tradition. Then again, no discrimination is made between the divergent accounts of Jesus' baptismal experience and the testimony of John the Baptist in the Synoptics and in the Fourth Gospel. Although recent criticism is inclined to admit the greater veracity of the Fourth Gospel in certain details, yet nothing has shaken the consensus of modern scholarship that the

Synoptics, especially Mark, give the basic outline of the life of Jesus and that St. John's narrative is at fundamental variance with that in its general conception and presentation.

The book takes its title from the author's interpretation of the term Son of Man, which Jesus constantly used with reference to himself. The Messianic consciousness of Jesus—"Son of Man" was one of the many Messianic titles current at the time—is a subject wrapt in mystery and fraught with controversy. There are those who hold that the whole Messianic concept was a delusion and that Jesus, in so far as he shared that expectation, was himself deluded. But our author makes Jesus conscious while on earth of being already the Supernatural Messiah, the Man from Heaven. He even traces the genesis of the doctrine of the Virgin Birth to Jesus' consciousness of having entered this world by such a supernatural process!

In view of this stupendous claim for his hero it is strange that the author tries to give naturalistic interpretations to the miracles and even to the resurrection and the ascension of Jesus. In his account of the raising of the dead son of the widow of Nain the analogy is brought in of a lady seriously hurt and thought to be dead but restored by prompt measures, and the suggestion is made that "the blood must have been warm about the young man's heart"! Even in the case of the raising of Lazarus, who, according to the Johannine narrative, which is the only authority for this incident and which the best scholars reject as unhistorical in spite of its dramatic setting, was four days dead and had been laid in the tomb, the question is mooted, "Was he wholly dead at all?" and the suggestion is made that Jesus' prayers may have maintained some life in him!

Surprisingly little is made of the teachings of the historic Jesus, with their vast implications and their dynamic applicability to the problems of war and peace, of Life and Death, even twenty centuries after they were uttered. *The Man from Heaven* may delight the imagination of those who accept the supernatural claims for Jesus the Messiah, but will have little appeal to those who see the kernel of the Gospel in the teachings and death of the Man of Nazareth.

S. K. GEORGE

The Pattern of Freedom. In Prose and Verse chosen by BRUCE L. RICHMOND. (Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

An anthology of verse and prose on the subject of Freedom, selected from the works of the great Thinkers of the West, both ancient and modern. A welcome publication in these days of oppression, of political domination and of personal slavery, when freedom of speech and liberty of thought are being assailed and threatened on every side.

It is another book of war propaganda but of the highest type. Though not free from national conceit and the pride of race, it has, on the whole, an elevating effect, tending to lift the mind and the heart from the humdrum round of everyday existence to eternal things. "Think on the seed ye spring from! Ye were made not to live life of brute beasts of the field but follow virtue and knowledge unafraid." All that is good and true and beautiful in England and in the Englishman, in social and political life, in war and peace, is brought out and held up as an ideal model, the imitation of which is the price of freedom. Sir Bruce Richmond has rightly perceived that a country's "peace will not be won by conquest and obliteration: it must be invented and constructed and maintained by endless effort, such as is given now to the perfection of war", and he builds up a wide vision of freedom, embracing every form of liberty, including liberty of mind and freedom of expression. "He wishes to break every yoke all over the world which hinders his brother from acting after his thought."

M. L.

Margaret Fuller : Whetstone of Genius. By MASON WADE. (The Viking Press, Inc., New York. $3.50)

During recent years the Transcendentalist group who wrote in the United States during the thirties, forties and fifties of the last century, including Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, Alcott and Dickinson, have been removed from the dusty closets of obscurity and introduced to the present generation. Of this illustrious group, not the least was Margaret Fuller.

This "strange, misty figure, living chiefly in apocryphal anecdotes" has been brought to life in real flesh and blood by Mason Wade in his *Margaret Fuller : Whetstone of Genius.* "She is a myth and a legend", says the author, but this carefully written book can hardly be read without the realization that Margaret Fuller was a very real individual who wielded a powerful influence the effects of which are present with us to-day. She has been largely forgotten because her writings have not lived as have those of her contemporaries, and former biographies have been quite inadequate.

Ralph Waldo Emerson was the leader of the Transcendentalist group. He was a close friend and an admirer of Margaret Fuller.

A leader of the Feminist movement, Margaret Fuller wrote the first book which clearly outlined that struggle. The book had wide currency in its day. She did much also to familiarize American readers with the masterpieces of German literature, though that language was hardly known in the United States when she began. She promoted interest in art and in literature, and predicted and urged the coming of the day when America would have an art and a literature of its own. The golden era of literature and of culture in the New England of the second quarter of the last century is more easily understood in the light of this clear and altogether brilliant biography of a great and sometimes misunderstood American woman.

Coming from a long line of arrogant but brilliant ancestors, Margaret was no exception to the tradition of her house. Her father, at first disappointed that she was not a boy, determined to give her a classical education that would rival that of the best educated young men. Thus very early she flew in the face of convention. Subjected to unbelievably rigorous standards, she began to read Latin at six. She was driven through long hours every day to study languages and the masterpieces of philosophy and of literature. Daylight hours were not enough but she studied far into the night. At last these pursuits became a passion and a habit with her. At the end of a long day, when the child did retire, she went to bed only to struggle with spectral illusions, nightmares and somnambulism. This precocious child carried with her into adulthood many of the quirks and abnormalities of her childhood.

Learned in all that cultured persons were expected to know, she was a leader among men and women at a time when women were expected to keep their opinions to themselves. She was the editor of *The Dial,* the influential journal of the Transcendentalists. In addition to teaching children, she conducted the famous "Conversations" for the women of Boston and later also for the men. She became the first columnist for Horace Greeley's *New York Tribune* and a foremost literary critic of the day. During her tour through Europe she sent dispatches to *The New York Tribune.* For months she gave herself to the struggle for Roman freedom.

Margaret was eccentric, self-critical, morbid at times and suffered because of her lack of beauty. But again she swam high on the waves of elation when she was the leader in her "Conversations". She, as well as others, knew that her power lay in conversation rather than in her pen. Deeply in earnest about the promotion of the Feminist cause and the establishment of a truly American literature and art, she worked so constantly and so intensely that she often became ill in mind and in body.

Filled with a passion for life, yet given too much to her scholarship to taste life

fully, she had a side that was little known in her own time and which has been brought out only by her present biographer. She longed to have a family of her own but her efforts in this direction were ill-fated. She fell in love with a rascal from New York and followed him to Europe before she realized her folly. In Italy, in her late thirties, she married an impoverished Italian marchese. For months she kept her marriage and the birth of her son secret even from her mother.

Her writings reveal the psychological change that came about in her after the birth of her child. "She had found happiness in being a woman and in fulfilling a woman's natural duties, and the long struggle between her masculine and feminine traits was ended at last." But her happiness was short-lived. After much hardship and frequent reiterations of her fear of impending doom, she, together with her son and her husband, lost her life in a tragic death at sea, at the age of forty years.

Margaret was a unique product of an advanced classical education forced upon a precocious but an immature mind. A woman a century ahead of her time in cultural training and thinking, she was wise, witty, fanciful, sarcastic, prophetic, sentimental and courageous, all in one peculiar mixture.

Margaret Fuller : Whetstone of Genius is carefully and accurately written and is delightful reading. In a clear-cut manner it throws light on the inclusive and all-but-meaningless term "Transcendentalism". It gives a better understanding of the period and of its leading figures than can otherwise be had.

FRANK R. MILLER

Science and Geeta. By T. N. ROY. (Printed by the Author for limited free distribution at 15-A Shyamananda Road, Calcutta.)

Since Wilkins introduced the *Gita* to the Western world nearly one hundred and fifty years ago, many have followed in his footsteps. Many more have written exegeses which so terrify the timid that they shun a book which at once appeals to the heart of a child and has the power to puzzle the most astute metaphysician—*a book which is meant for all.*

A member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Mr. Roy has no mean reputation. He is anxious to popularize the *Gita* by a justification of Sri Krishna's teachings in the light of that Western science which, until it felt the reaction from Madame Blavatsky's work, was grossly materialistic. "All thoughtful men", he writes, "are against such combination (of religion and science) for the reason that the best interests of both would be served by keeping them separate", yet his outline of Einstein's, Reimann's, Eddington's and James's ideas on space, cosmic geometry and psychology supported by copious footnotes is just such an attempt to combine them. He sees no disparity between the negations of science and a belief in an almost Jehovistic miracle-working deity.

Mr. Roy's scientific acumen may have widened his field of knowledge; it has not deepened his spiritual understanding and his book, published for the "well-educated....who through adverse circumstances have lost their peace of mind", is not calculated to bring solace to the heart in need of a rendition perchance less learned but more mystical, more poetic, more divinely human.

The *Gita* is essentially a personal book and when all is said and done, when commentaries, essays and exegeses have been laid aside, we turn to the simple, honest words of Lord Krishna whose message is to the heart, and *through* it to the head—whose teaching demands no intellectual acrobatics as a *sine qua non* to its understanding, and whose spirit no commentary, however learned, can finally reveal.

H. T. V.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS

No thoughtful student of international relations can ignore the part played by economics in world affairs. Its rôle is, in fact, more likely to be exaggerated than minimised. Mr. Thomas John Watson, Honorary President of the International Chamber of Commerce, whose article "After the War—What?" is reprinted in *International Conciliation* for September brands unsound economics as "one of the major causes of war and of most of our national troubles". It is indisputably a cause but it is not a primary cause. It has to be traced to its root in human attitude. That root is selfishness, national and individual. Selfishness includes more than the crude and frank acquisitiveness that by common consent deserves the name; and it must be admitted that the threat which isolation offers to the industrial structure of the U.S.A. looms large in the background of Mr. Watson's argument.

He does well, however, to insist on a post-war basis for the international exchange of goods and services "that will be just as fair to one country as to another, regardless of size". Absolute justice, of course, can make no difference between the many and the few. The problem of how "to give security to all nations of the world and to all people", he declares, "will not be confined to any one country, any one race, or any one religion, but will be a world problem which must be dealt with fairly".

Fairness to all is a noble ideal but its objectification calls for widespread and drastic reorientation of thought. There is no place in such a scheme for cut-throat competition either for raw materials or for markets; no place for imperialist exploitation. Fairness to all must be recognized as incompatible with exclusive national interest. But until the basis for a regenerating practical Brotherhood is laid in the minds and in the hearts of men universal equity must remain a pious hope. An effective will to justice demands the acceptance by the leaders in all countries, if not by the majority, of human solidarity as a fact in nature because the ensouling Spirit is one in all, and of the corollary axiom that to wrong one man or one nation is to injure in the long run not only oneself but also the whole of humanity. A higher ideal even than "Service before self" is "self-forgetting service". A greater American than Mr. Watson glimpsed this ideal nearly a century and half ago. George Washington expressed the spirit which, generally adopted, would leave no room for the self-seeking that leads to injustice and ultimately to war:—

> My first wish is to see the whole world in peace, and the inhabitants of it as one band of brothers, striving who should contribute most to the happiness of mankind.

Through the smoke of the European conflagration some thoughtful and conscientious men seem to be groping their way, slowly but surely, to nobler social and economic ideals. And the conviction is spreading that something must be done about those ideals now, before victory, relieving the tension of uncertainty, allows resolution and effort to flag.

An editorial in *The Manchester Guardian* for August 28th endorses Mr. Churchill's statement that many ideas about the future shape of Europe "are held in common by all good men and all free men" but insists that

> the discussion and sifting of those ideas by good men of all countries must not wait till victory is won. We have to make it clear that we do not wish to substitute for

a world order designed to suit Germany a world order designed to suit Britain, and that no selfish interests will be allowed to thwart or embarrass the common purpose.

A world order is referred to, but does even such a broad and liberal organ as *The Manchester Guardian* take a genuine world view? It is easy to deride the German school maps that in the early years of this century showed the Reich drawn out of scale with the rest of Europe as its insignificant fringe, but in the mind of the average European, be he statesman or commoner, does not Europe occupy the centre of the map in much the same way, with the vast remainder of the land surface of the globe serving as a decorative fringe? Not a Europe of free peoples but a world of free peoples should be the aim of England in this war.

And the contemplated reform in the world order to be effective must begin at home—in the Empire.

Professor Harold J. Laski, writing in *Time and Tide* for August 31st, sees Britain's setting of her own house in order as necessary "not as a promise in a distant future" but as a living part of her war effort. It will not do to wait until the war is won to try to end imperialism and unemployment and to work for educational reconstruction and for social justice and an equality that ignores race and colour and creed, instead of making them part of the strategy of winning the war.

We who seek to incite those tragic masses to revolt whom the outlaws have conquered cannot stir them to hope and exhilaration and courage merely by drawing cheques upon the credit of the future. We secure political rebellion abroad by building social justice at home; in war there is no precept but practice. And in war there is no high road to the heart of a people save through the power of the magnanimity which is built upon faith in the transcendent aim.

And let none fancy that only the underprivileged would benefit from the contemplated social reforms and the elimination of the wide inequalities of wealth which Professor Laski condemns. The luxurious lives of careless indifference and of selfish indulgence led by many at the upper end of the social scale bear a direct relation to the penury and the privation at the lower end and are at least as unwholesome as the latter for the individuals concerned and no less dangerous to society. Another writer in the same issue of *Time and Tide* quotes a Mayfair millionaire as saying wistfully, "After the war there won't, please God, be any young women living the kind of life my daughters and their friends have lived." A social worker, who heard him, remarked—"Not a terribly important peace aim." But the columnist disagrees :—

The life led by the millionaire's daughters destroys them, body, soul and mind. And when any group in a community is being destroyed body, soul and mind, the whole sanitary system of society is infected. A kind of spiritual typhus is produced which spreads to quarters far removed from the focus of decay.

Society is one and its health, like that of any organism, depends upon the health of all its parts.

In the second issue for 1940 of *Hechos e Ideas* (Buenos Aires) Señor Rene Jimenez Malaret considers a question which all subject peoples may well ask respecting their own countries : "Will Independence Solve Porto Rico's Problems?" Señor Malaret's analysis is pertinent because a situation like our own has its value as a mirror. The position of the Porto Ricans is fairly typical of that of any people under the imperialistic domination of a race that differs from it in physical complexion and that erects the paltry difference in pigmentation to the dignity of a cultural barrier.

In spite of all that can be said against Spain as a colonizing power, her administration was at least not marred by the racial prejudice which has borne heavily upon the island since it was ceded in 1898 to the United States, the dominant majority of whose people, especially in the South, share to the full the senseless Anglo-Saxon pride of race. Under Spanish rule there had been miscegenation in Porto Rico to such an extent that there were no hard-and-fast lines between Red Indians, Whites and Negroes. What is the position of this mixed population to-day?

There exists a belief among Americans of

the U. S. A. that the "natives", as they call the citizens of Porto Rico, are Negroes. This is false.....The attitude of the first Spaniards who came to Porto Rico and who settled there as if it were their home ... is in direct contrast with that adopted by the Americans who come to Porto Rico. These Americans in general hold aloof from the "*natives*" and from their institutions and social centres. They form isolated groups and spend their time criticising the citizens of Porto Rico, believing themselves their superiors, although in a good many cases they are nothing more nor less than adventurers who have failed in their own country. This attitude on the part of Americans in Porto Rico has done much to increase the feeling in our island against the United States.....

If the United States is not to consider Porto Rico as an integral part of its own country, is not to defend its agriculture, its commerce, against foreign competition even when such competition might benefit the United States itself or benefit the United States in its international relations, if the United States is not to treat Porto Rico as an equal—an equal at least in economic matters—and if the Legislature of Porto Rico cannot come to some agreement to request the necessary changes in its original Constitution that now regulates it...then the very best that the United States can do is to take the initiative and to leave Porto Rico to work out its own destiny.

But while Señor Malaret declares that many of the difficulties of Porto Rico are the direct consequences of their relationship with the United States, he recognizes the definite responsibility of the Porto Ricans themselves for many others.

Throughout these notes we have tried to demonstrate how many of the difficulties that we now face in Porto Rico are the result of our own mistakes, of our lack of initiative, of our lack of a patriotic spirit, of our lack of collective action and our incapacity to see sufficiently far ahead the evils that were coming so as to fight them or to mitigate them.

Señor Malaret concludes that the mere attainment of home rule will not solve the Porto Ricans' problems. They must solve their own problems through their own growth and their own stamina.

"The myth is not my own. I had it from my mother." With this quotation from Euripides Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy begins his significant study of folklore in the current *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society* under the title "Primitive Mentality". He maintains the reality of the mythical world and its existence "for ever in the eternal now of the Truth, regardless of the truth or error of history", crossing swords with Sir J. G. Fraser who regarded the folk beliefs and popular rites which he had made his life study as "a dark, a tragic chronicle of human error and folly, of fruitless endeavour, wasted time and blighted hopes"—words which, as Dr. Coomaraswamy truly remarks, "would seem to apply rather to a view of modern European civilisation than to any view of tribal society!"

Dr. Coomaraswamy holds that the metaphysics of the common people bears a relation to that of the learned like the relation of the lesser to the greater mysteries.

So long as the material of folklore is transmitted, so long is the ground available on which the superstructure of full initiatory understanding can be built.....To have lost the art of thinking in images.....is.... to have lost the proper linguistic of metaphysics and to have descended to the verbal logic of "philosophy".

He analyses a few of the ancient art motifs, such as the straight pin or needle, symbol of generation, and the safety-pin, symbol of regeneration and of the "'thread-spirit' (*sūtrātman*) by which the Sun connects all things to himself and fastens them". It is inconceivable for the metaphysician

that forms such as this, which express a given doctrine with mathematical precision, could have been "invented" without a knowledge of their significance...(one might as well pretend that a mathematical formula could have been discovered by chance).

In the savage culture survive "the vestiges of a primordial state of metaphysical understanding". He believes that the whole body of folklore motifs

represents a consistent tissue of interrelated intellectual doctrines belonging to a primordial wisdom rather than to a primitive science: and that for this wisdom it would be almost impossible to conceive a popular, or even in any ordinary sense of the words a human origin. The life of the popular wisdom extends backward to a point at which it becomes indistinguishable from the primordial tradition itself, the traces of which we are more familiar with in the

sacerdotal and royal arts: and it is in this sense, and by no means with any "democratic" implications, that the lore of the people, expressed in their culture, is really the word of God.

To what does this point but to the primeval revelation made by Divine Instructors to the elect among infant humanity, of which Indian tradition so confidently speaks?

While it is true that the West needs desperately the wisdom of the ancient East, it is also true that the West, in spite of its materialistic bent, has something to give to modern India. Under the surface of Western culture down the centuries has run a clear subterranean current which is beneficent and creative, even spiritual. It has gushed up here and there, in historical as in modern times, in the works of artists and scientists, humanitarians and thinkers, some of whom come very close indeed to the Eastern doctrines in their surmises and deductions.

It would not be strange if among the latter were to be found clues to the understanding of recondite ancient teachings which to-day are enigmatic to those whose heritage they are. Such Professor P. S. Naidu believes to be the case in reference to the still vexed question of *Rasa*. In his article, "The Rasa Doctrine and the Concept of Suggestion in Hindu Aesthetics" (*Journal of the Annamalai University*, September 1940), he declares that the key which can open this secret chamber is in the hands of the Western psychologist of the hormic or purposivistic school, of which William McDougall was the leading exponent.

The *Rasa* of ancient Indian psychology is a complex mental experience "generated in the mind of an adult whose mental structure has evolved to a fairly high level through the formation of complex sentiments, the excitant being an aesthetic object". Its analysis demands the breaking up of the complex into its fundamental elements, the *sthāyi bhāvas*, which the writer identifies with the "propensities" of Professor McDougall, each aroused to activity by certain excitants, objects or ideas, which generate a specific emotion and lead to a characteristic response.

Professor McDougall assigns a very important rôle to these propensities or instinctive dispositions, claiming that without them and their powerful impulses

> the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed....These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies.

Without going into technical details we may cite one or two important points which Professor Naidu makes. One relates to "sympathetic induction" by which the expression of a particular emotion by one individual acts as an excitant of the corresponding emotion in another. Such induction is possible, he writes, not only at the primitive emotional level but also at the higher sentimentative level—an added incentive surely to nobility of feeling and of expression.

Another valuable point is his definition of real culture and real character in terms of the building up by individual or nation of a permanent scale of values, wherein each sentiment has its own fixed place, with the same dominant sentiment always occupying the top place; and the lesson he draws therefrom for India:—

> For the Westerner at the present stage of culture, the self-regarding sentiment is the master sentiment, while for us the Brahman-regarding sentiment has been from time immemorial, and should continue to be the master sentiment. We should allow no other sentiment to displace it from its high eminence.

Señor Angel Ossorio y Gallardo in *Hechos e Ideas* (Buenos Aires) for March-April objects to the modern use of the old Roman term "Dictator" in a sense quite different from that which it bore in ancient Rome. Only in a great emergency was a Dictator appointed and his term of office was rigidly fixed. An outstanding man who commanded the confidence of the people was nominated by the Senate and given temporary full

powers somewhat as a modern Parliament is, in a crisis. Tribunes continued in office, all other Magistrates being superseded by the Dictator. He had absolute power, but only for a few weeks, rarely for a few months. Therefore, Señor Gallardo maintains, it is a gross misnomer to apply the name of Dictator to the Hitlers and the Mussolinis of the totalitarian countries. To-day, he declares, "There are no dictatorships; there are only tyrannies."

It is an aspect of the old problem of free-will and fate, applied to a civilisation instead of to the individual, that Dr. Hilda Oakeley considers in her article in *The Hibbert Journal* for July on "Freedom or Necessity in the Making of History". She distinguishes between moral freedom—freedom in the motive of action—and historic freedom—freedom, in spite of the limitations imposed by the actions of our predecessors, to construct and to hand on to those who follow us "the kind of organisation which would offer some hope of the saving of civilisation". She sees the permanence of a civilisation as dependent upon "unity of mind in historic purpose" and its progress as handicapped by the discontinuity in the human factor as generation succeeds generation, with different valuations and aims.

> We receive from the former ages a task which we should not have freely chosen and our conception of the way to carry it out and purify our civilisation from the evil which is included in its inheritance may not be accepted by the age that follows. Dominated by a different ideal that generation may destroy our foundations and lay their own once more to be rejected by later men.

The distinction which Dr. Oakeley draws between the individual and society in relation to this problem is more apparent than real; a ratio is not changed by multiplying both its elements by the same number; the relation between larger figures becomes somewhat less easy to grasp; that is all. The parallel is very close between society and the individual considered as a continuing being, expressing itself in successive incarnations, always through a new personality. The latter is the child of its predecessor as truly as to-day is the child of yesterday and as each generation is the offspring of the one which precedes it. Each generation, like each individual, passes through regular stages—helpless dependence, learning to stand alone and to walk, partial repudiation of the tutelage of the past, striking out a new course, achievement and the effort to hand on the combined results of tradition and of testing, and then decline of powers and retirement from the scene—the only difference being the greater obviousness of the overlap between generations.

The freedom of society as of the individual at any given time is complete within the frame imposed by past choices. The unbroken continuity has its great advantages. It orients us in time, establishing our relation to both past and future, just as the perception of the essential unity of manifested life gives us our spatial bearings and reveals the network of interrelationship among all of us here and now. Each generation forms a wave in the one stream of life, as each personality is a new mask for the continuing individual, moulded from the materials of the masks that he has worn before. If each mask is related to its predecessor, its connection with the continuing entity whom it clothes is still more intimate; the spiritual afflatus from the Higher Self, which however discontinuous or rare is sometimes undeniable, would otherwise remain inexplicable. Analogously it is the larger interrelationship, and especially the life current which runs through and links the successive generations, that makes possible from time to time the quickening of men *en masse* by the spiritual impetus from the great thinkers and teachers, past and present.

The question of historic freedom really boils down to this: Can we impose rigidly upon the coming generations the pattern for growth that seems to us good? Fortunately, measuring the depth of our unwisdom by the tangle we have made of our world, we cannot. We

shall bequeath them a fine snarl and, along with it, our own inheritance of the immemorial principles which would have prevented that snarl if we had not so disastrously failed to apply them. The demonstration most convincing to our successors of the validity of those principles would have been their application in practice. That demonstration our generation has not given, save for an individual here and there; we can therefore only hope that the plight to which the flouting of those principles has brought us will serve as an effective warning, and lead in future to more than lip service of the ideals which we profess.

Archibald MacLeish brings a convincing indictment against "The Irresponsibles" in *The Nation* (New York) for May 18th. His charge, while brought specifically against American scholars and writers, applies also to their class in other countries. His challenge is, why, despite all warnings, they have failed to fight the present menace to civilization with their powerful weapons of ideas and words?

Leonardo, when Michelangelo reproached him for his indifference to the misfortunes of the Florentines, replied, "Indeed, indeed, the study of beauty has occupied my whole heart." A similar defence would, Mr. MacLeish believes, be offered by present-day scholars and writers as a group. They have assumed that political and economic matters were no concern of theirs and should be left to the practical man. The latter, however, is the least endangered by recent developments.

> It is precisely the scholar, the poet—the man whose care is for the structures of the intellect, the houses of the mind—whose heart is caught. For it is the scholar's goods which are in danger.

And they are endangered to-day as never before. In fact, Mr. MacLeish states, however truth may have been suppressed and mutilated in the past, the attackers have claimed, however hypocritically, to be acting in the name of truth. The forms of culture were preserved. The uniqueness of the present menace of force lies in its repudiation of the very forms of culture and in the brutal cynicism which does not even trouble to attempt moral self-justification.

Everyone's responsibility is proverbially no one's responsibility. Mr. MacLeish attributes the inertia of present-day scholars and writers to the bifurcation of the former virile class of men of letters which once comprised both groups. In former times,

> whatever threatened learning or the ends of learning challenged the man of letters. Whatever struck at truth or closed off question or defiled an art or violated decency of thinking struck at him. And he struck back with every weapon masters of the word could find to strike with...Las Casas, Milton and Voltaire were men of letters, men who confessed an obligation to defend the disciplines of thought not in their own but in the general interest.

In these days the pen no more than the sword should sleep in the hand of him who can wield it in the cause of human freedom.

ULT LIBRARY
BANGALORE.
Accn. No. 134